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Walking the Invisible Line of
Punitive Damages:
TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.
.I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1993, with its decision in TXO Production Corp. v. Alli-
ance Resources Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court turned down
an embossed invitation to set forth bright line due process standards
for punitive damages In TXO, six Justices joined in upholding a puni-
tive damages award over 500 times the actual damages award.' Howev-
er, the majority could not agree on the same rationale for upholding the
award," leaving legal practitioners in the dark concerning the standards
1. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
2. High Court Refuses to Cap Punitive Damages Awards, S.F. CHRON., June 26,
1993, at BI. "The U.S. Supreme Court . . . again rejected an invitation by American
businesses to set new constitutional limits on huge punitive damage awards." Id. See
also J. Stratton Shartel, High Court Should Reject Arbitrary Solutions in Punitive
Damages, PRENTICE HALL L & Bus., Apr. 1993, at 2; Linda S. Mullenix, Questions
Linger on Punitives and Evidence, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S4. Many commenta-
tors believed that "the high court . . . need[ed] to outline factors that courts...
[could] use to analyze state provisions for jury instructions and trial court review of
punitive damages" and that the TXO case was the perfect opportunity for such a rul-
ing. Id.
3. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2711. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Blackmun, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined in affirming the punitive damages
award. Id. For further discussion of the opinions forming the majority, see infra
notes 200-77 and accompanying text.
4. A plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, upheld the punitive damages award because it was "reasonable" under both
substantive and procedural due process. Id. at 2719. Justice Kennedy wrote a sepa-
rate opinion, concluding that the substantive due process analysis should focus not
on the monetary amount of the punitive damages award, but on the jury's reasons
for assessing it. Id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, wrote a separate opinion, concluding that punitive damages implicate
no substantive due process rights and, thus, should be upheld so long as the proce-
dures are "reasonable." Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a more detailed dis-
cussion of these opinions and the Justices' definitions of "reasonable," see infra
against which punitive awards will be assessed by juries and reviewed
by trial and appellate courts in the future.5 All that is certain is that
punitive damages awards must be "reasonable"' and that the proce-
dures utilized to award punitive damages must be "due."7
TXO's fatal mistakes were recording a frivolous quitclaim deed and
then suing Alliance to clear this purported "cloud" on Alliance's title to
oil and gas rights on a West Virginia tract known as "Blevins Tract."'
Catching wind of TXO's "turnabout" behavior, Alliance filed a counter-
claim against TXO for slander of title." The jury found TXO liable for
slander of title and returned a verdict for $19,000 in actual damages and
$10 million in punitive damages."0 In response to TXO's due process
challenge on appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the
award, holding that because TXO was not merely a "really stupid" negli-
gent defendant, but a "really mean" intentional wrongdoer, this defen-
dant got what it deserved." Despite overwhelming criticism of the
notes 200-77 and accompanying text. See also Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tanger,
Stopping the Deluge of Costly Punishment, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 9, 1993, at 16 (terming
the TXO decision "a cacophony of opinions").
5. Supreme Court Proceedings, U.S.LW., daily ed., Aug. 11, 1993. "The problem in
the wake of the [C]ourt's splintered decision is not whether there are substantive due
process limits on punitive damages, but how to determine what they are. The
[Jiustices were unable to craft a majority opinion . . . ." Id.
6. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. The TXO plurality held that the substantive due pro-
cess of punitive damages awards should be judged against a "mid-tier" reasonableness
standard. Id. See also Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. INFO. INST. REP., Sept.
1993 (noting that the determination of whether punitive damages awards are reason-
able will now be in the hands of state courts).
7. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723. In this instance, the definition of "due" encompasses
procedural protections, such as proper jury instructions and meaningful trial and
appellate court review of punitive damages awards. Id. See also Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991) (setting forth specific procedural safeguards
that must exist in order for punitive damages awards to stand).
8. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2714-15. For further discussion of the facts and procedural
history of the case, see infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text.
9. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716.
10. Id. at 2717. The plurality pointed out several times in its opinion that this
punitive damages award is 526 times the actual damages award. See, e.g., id. at 2718,
2721.
11. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992),
affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). The West Virginia Supreme Court set forth two main
categories of defendants and explained that punitive damages are allowed against
"really stupid" or extremely careless defendants in order "to give individual plaintiffs
a sword with which to fight well-armored, bureaucratic defendants." Id. at 888-89. On
the other hand, "really mean" defendants, those who act intentionally to harm others,
can have larger punitive damages awards assessed against them because their evil
acts require a greater amount of deterrence. Id. at 889.
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state supreme court decision by commentators, 2 the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed. 3
The TXO decision marked an end to the Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Haslip' era." In upholding a punitive damages award that
was just over four times the compensatory damages award, the Haslip
Court suggested that this ratio was "close to the line ... of constitu-
tional impropriety.""6 In response to Haslip, lower courts throughout
the country made great efforts to adhere to this inferred "four-to-one"
rule. 7 The TXO decision now grants lower courts permission to violate
that Haslip "rule" and award punitive damages as high as 500 times the
actual damages if the defendants are "mean" enough."
TXO has received massive media coverage since its announcement in
June 1993."' Many have criticized the Court for declining to set forth
12. See id. at 895-96 (McHugh, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for their
use of such nontraditional and nontechnical language). See also Shartel, supra note 2,
at 2; Arvin Maskin & Peter A. Antonucci, Developments in the Law of Punitive Dam-
ages, C837 ALI-ABA 541, 621 (1993).
13. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2713. The Court affirmed the West Virginia Supreme Court's
decision, holding that the punitive damages award assessed against TXO violated nei-
ther substantive nor procedural due process. Id.
14. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
15. Haslip was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court addressed
due process challenge to punitive damages. See, e.g., J. Mark Hart, The Constitution-
ality of Punitive Damages: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 21 CUMB. L.
REV. 584, 589 (1991). TXO did not overrule Haslip. In fact, TXO followed Haslip. See
TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2711. However, TXO did put an end to the idea that a punitive
damages award that is four times the actual damages award is "close to the line" of
constitutional acceptability Id. at 2721. For further discussion of Haslip, see infra
notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
16. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
17. See, e.g., Harrell v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 75, 80 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding a punitive damages award six times the actual damages award); Dunn v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929, 950-51 (1991) (ordering remittitur of a
punitive damages award 19 times the actual damages award to be consistent with the
Haslip four-to-one rule); Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532,
547 (Ct. App. 1992) (ordering remittitur of a punitive damages award to $2 million
and remittitur of a compensatory damages award to $500,000 to be consistent with
Haslip).
18. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721. According to the plurality, punitive damages
awards should be proportional to the harm that is likely to be caused and the harm
actually caused by the defendant's conduct. Id.
19. See, e.g., Frey & Tanger, supra note 4, at 20; Mullenix, supra note 2, at 84;
Robert Giuffra, Turning Down the Volume, THE RECORDER, Aug. 26, 1993, at 9 (dis-
cussing the TXO decision and its ramifications).
clear standards for the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.'
On the other hand, some commentators have praised the Court for
withstanding the pressure from tort reformers to set forth such a
test.2' The end result is that the state courts and legislatures are left to
determine what constitutes a "reasonable" award.'
This Note will critique the Court's decision in TXO and discuss TXO's
place and impact on the future development of punitive damages in the
United States. Part II traces the history of punitive damages, with a spe-
cific focus on the major due process challenges to punitive damages.'
Part III presents a summary of the facts and procedural history of
TXO.24 Part IV analyzes the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions in the TXO decision.25 In Part V, the judicial, legislative, political,
and social impacts of TXO are considered.' Part VI provides a con-
cluding word on TXO, discusses the present state of punitive damages
and due process, and presents some recently decided and currently
pending punitive damages cases.7
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages can be traced back to sources as ancient as the
Babylonian Hammurabi Code, the Hindu Code of Manu, and the Bi-
ble.' Early Roman law employed a form of punitive damages to pro-
20. Frey & Tanger, supra note 4, at 20 (noting and rebutting such criticism of the
TXO decision). TXO has been criticized for "constitut[ing] a near fatal blow to due
process review of large punitive verdicts." Id. The TXO Court has been described as
"an example of a judiciary that has lost its collective mind." Robert Rice, Business
and the Law: The Right Rules Supreme-America's Highest Court Was Dominated
by Conservatives in the '92-93 Term, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at 14.
21. See, e.g., Shartel, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that while the Court should set
forth standards, these standards should not be too specific). For a detailed discussion
of the tort reform movement and its response to the TXO case, see infra notes 72-
97, 370-83 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 359-60 and accompanying text (noting that the pronouncement
of punitive damages limitations is probably now left for state courts and legislatures).
23. See infra notes 28-180.
24. See infra notes 181-99.
25. See infra notes 200-325.
26. See infra notes 326-409.
27. See infra notes 410-22.
28. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Dam-
ages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993). See
also Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones, Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of
Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S LJ. 797, 799
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tect the common people from wealthy elites.' During the Eighteenth
Century, the concept of using punitive damages to protect the poor
from the rich was adopted first by England,' and then by the United
States.'
Genay v. Norris,' decided in 1784 by the South Carolina Supreme
Court, is the earliest reported United States punitive damages case.'
The Genay court established that assessing "vindictive damages " ' was
allowed where "a very serious injury to the plaintiff.., entitled him to
(1987). For a detailed discussion of these and other ancient sources of punitive dam-
ages, see LINDA L SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 3-6 (2d ed.
1989).
29. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1286 (citing WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, A
TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 598 (3d ed. 1966)). For example, in early Roman law,
punitive damages were awarded in cases in which the defendant threw something
from his home onto a common street, thereby injuring the plaintiff. Id. However, it
has been argued that this sort of multiple damage remedy was not analogous to
modern punitive damages. Id.
30. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763) (assessing "exemplary dam-
ages" against agents of the King in conjunction with liability for false imprisonment
and trespass actions); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763) (awarding the
publisher of a newspaper critical of the King's staff "exemplary damages" in conjunc-
tion with a trespass action). Huckle and Wilkes are the landmark English "exemplary
damages" cases. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 799. "Exemplary damages" was
an early term for "punitive damages;" the two terms are virtually synonymous. Id. An
early King's Bench described exemplary damages as "damages .. . awarded not mere-
ly to recompense the plaintiff for the loss he has sustained by reason of the
defendant's wrongful act, but to punish the defendant in an exemplary manner, and
vindicate the distinction between a wilful and an innocent wrongdoer." Grey v. Grant,
2 Wils. K.B. 252 (C.P. 1764). For a more in depth discussion of punitive damages in
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century England, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note
28, at 12-15; Punitive Damages: Divergence In Search Of A Rationale, 40 ALA. L
REV. 741, 745-50 (1989); JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1985).
31. Punitive damages first appeared in American case law in 1784, just 21 years
after Huckle and Wilkes. For further discussion of the development of punitive dam-
ages in America, see infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
32. 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 6 (1784).
33. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1290. "Vindictive damages" were assessed
against a physician who secretly spiked the plaintiffs drink with a medical chemical,
which caused the plaintiff "extreme and excruciating pain." Genay, 1 S.C.L (1 Bay)
at 6.
34. "Vindictive damages" is yet another early term for punitive damages. The two
are virtually synonymous. See SCHLUETER & KENNETH, supra note 28, at 2. See, e.g.,
G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985) (using the two
terms interchangeably).
very exemplary damages" and where the defendant had knowledge of
the likely harmful effects of his actions.' By the late 1700s and early
1800s, several American courts had upheld punitive damages awards,'
primarily based on outrageous, wilful, and wanton conduct." By 1851,
the United States Supreme Court recognized that punitive damages
were "a well-established principle of the common law.., for torts...
[based on] the enormity of [the] offence. " '
B. Original Purposes Behind Punitive Damages
Unlike compensatory damages, a remedy designed to make the plain-
tiff whole by compensating for actual losses,30 punitive damages ex-
tend above and beyond actual losses.' Punitive damages were original-
ly assessed against powerful, more fortunate people who bullied the
less powerful." Punitive damages were designed to protect disadvan-
taged people, such as women, children, and invalids, against those who
were more socially or physically powerful. 2 The purpose behind this
remedy was to punish and deter wrongdoers and to maintain social
peace and norms.' Punitive damages served as a bridge between civil
35. Genay, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 7. The Court held that the plaintiff, by virtue of his
.professional character," must have had knowledge of this chemical's potential effects.
Id.
36. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1291. See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1
N.J.L 77 (1791) (awarding punitive damages against a defendant for breaching his
promise to marry the plaintiff); Bateman v. Goodyear, 12 Conn. 575, 575-77 (1838)
(awarding punitive damages in a trespass case); Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas.
957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1681) (awarding punitive damages in a patent infringe-
ment case); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818) (awarding punitive damages in an
admiralty case where a woman was held captive at sea).
37. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 800. See, e.g., Bateman, 12 Conn. at 575-
77 (assessing punitive damages against a defendant who broke into the plaintiffs
shop); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (upholding punitive damages in
trespass and tort cases when justified by the enormity of the offense).
38. Day, 54 U.S. at 371. See also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1291; Hart,
supra note 15, at 586.
39. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages And Le-
gal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1404 (1993).
40. For a comparison in depth of compensatory and punitive damages, see Ken-
neth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Role of
Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 415, 416 (1989).
41. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1292.
42. See, e.g., Hollins v. Gorham, 66 S.W. 823, 823 (Ky. 1902) (assessing punitive
damages against a defendant who assaulted a twelve year old boy); Nyman v. Lynde,
101 N.W. 163, 163 (Minn. 1904) (assessing punitive damages against a defendant for
child abuse); Cathey v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 130 S.W. 130, 131-34 (Mo. 1910) (assess-
ing punitive damages against a defendant who kicked a cripple in the face).
43. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1294. Punitive damages maintained socialjustice because they served as an incentive for tort victims to pursue civil punish-
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and criminal law, whereby victims of civil offenses, to whom the crimi-
nal system afforded no punitive remedy, could seek to punish the per-
petrator."
In general, early Nineteenth Century courts assessed punitive damag-
es only in cases of willful conduct or gross disregard,' offenses that
were largely seen as quasi-criminal.' The focus was on the protection
of individuals from other individuals.47 By the late Nineteenth Century,
however, the focus had shifted to protecting individuals from powerful
corporations, due to the advent of the corporate culture.48
ment of the tortfeasor. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 28, at 400. For a discussion
of the modem purposes of punitive damages, see infra notes 66-71 and accompany-
ing text.
Other early rationales for punitive damages included justification for excessive
verdicts, compensation for mental suffering, compensation for other intangible harm,
deterrence, redressing of unequal criminal punishment, and revenge. SCHLUETER &
REDDEN, supra note 28, at 8-12.
44. Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional Restraints on
the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 916-17 (1990). "Although
imposed in civil cases, punitive damages are universally recognized as fulfilling pur-
poses traditionally associated with criminal law: punishment, and through punishment,
retribution and deterrence." Id. at 908. See also Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the
Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 Am. U. L.
REV. 1365, 1368-69 (1993) (noting that "punitive damages were developed ... to
serve as an auxiliary, or 'helper' to the criminal law system"). See generally Note,
The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages,
41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158 (1966).
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Punitive damages were almost never
assessed for mere ordinary negligence. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 799.
46. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 799. "Exemplary damages became a meth-
od by which society could punish and attempt to deter abhorrent or morally repre-
hensible conduct." Id.
47. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1294-95. In order to punish and deter indi-
vidual tortfeasors, they were required to pay their respective victims money above
and beyond the actual harm they had caused. For further discussion of the punish-
ment and deterrence rationales, see infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
48. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1295. "In early punitive damages cases
against corporations, courts typically held that the corporation was liable only if it ei-
ther ordered the misconduct or condoned it by a refusal to take remedial steps." Id.
at 1295 n.128. See, e.g., Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106
(1893) (holding that corporations are only liable for punitive damages if they partici-
pated or authorized the wrongful conduct).
C. Early Opposition to Punitive Damages
Along with the increasing acceptance of punitive damages by United
States courts during the Nineteenth Century came opposition from
many legal scholars and academicians." Opponents contended that
punitive damages could not be reconciled with the compensatory na-
ture of tort law.' Furthermore, the social justice of punitive damages
was questioned." Many commentators believed that punitive damages
should go to the state, rather than the plaintiff.52 Additionally, they ar-
gued that punitive damages were only appropriate in cases where tradi-
tional methods of damage assessment were inapplicable.'
Much of this opposition stemmed from the strong push toward a
clear separation between public law and private law, which occurred
during the Nineteenth Century.' Many legal scholars, led by Harvard
Law School Professor Simon Greenleaf, viewed punitive damages as a
means by which tort law could regulate conduct, effectively blurring the
49. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages In Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. RE v. 1173, 1176
(1931) ("Although the practice of allowing punitive damages (as such) is centuries
old, and is now followed in all but a few American jurisdictions, the practice has fre-
quently been forcefully criticized.").
50. Id. at 1177. Morris noted that opponents of punitive damages "do not disfavor
the award of 'compensatory' damages, even though the basis of defendants' liability is
sub-standard conduct." Id. Opponents argue that punitive damages require the defen-
dant to pay an amount over and above compensatory damages. Id. at 1178.
51. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1298 & n.137. Many believed that awarding
successful plaintiffs large sums of money above and beyond actual damages was
simply unfair because it provided them with a windfall. Morris, supra note 49, at
1177.
52. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1298 n.137, 1302 & n.159. This notion rais-
es a possible eighth amendment excessive fines issue. For a more detailed discussion
of the interface between punitive damages and the Eighth Amendment, see infra
notes 101, 128-30 and accompanying text. See also Clay R. Stevens, Note, Split-Re-
covery: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Damage Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV.
695, 857 (1994) (discussing the constitutionality of allocating a portion of punitive
damage awards to one other than the plaintiff). This type of punitive damage alloca-
tion rectifies some of the inequities associated with punitive damage awards. Id. at
855. Some commentators propose model split-recovery statutes that pass constitutional
scrutiny and, thus, effectively alleviate some of the concerns inherent with punitive
damage awards. See id. at 855.
53. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1298 n.140. Professor Simon Greenleaf was
one of the most zealous of the Nineteenth Century punitive damages opponents. See
i fra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
54. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1299. In the Nineteenth Century, legal
scholars categorized all legal doctrines as either public or private law. Public law in-
cluded criminal, constitutional, and regulatory law, while private law included tort,
contract, property, and commercial law. Id. But see Angela P. Harris, Rereading Pu-
nitive Damages: Beyond the Public/lPrivate Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1079 (1989)
(arguing that this distinction is no longer applicable).
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public/private law distinction.' In response to Greenleafs opposition
to punitive damages, a support movement arose, spearheaded by Theo-
dore Sedgwick, a legal writer and practitioner.' Sedgwick argued that
"oppression, brutality or insult in the infliction of a wrong is a cause for
the allowance of exemplary damages."57 The Greenleaf-Sedgwick de-
bate continued throughout the remainder of the Nineteenth Century;
however, courts continued to award punitive damages.'
D. Punitive Damages Modernly
By the turn of the century, punitive damages were well established
and accepted in the United States.' Until the late 1950s, punitive dam-
ages award amounts remained relatively small and relatively proportion-
al to compensatory damages.' For example, as of 1955, one of the
largest punitive damages awards in United States history amounted to
only $75,000." However, in the early 1960s, the size and frequency of
punitive damages awards increased, and they have been increasing
steadily ever since.' Furthermore, many commentators have observed
55. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 n.2 (16th ed.
1899). Private law was non-coercive. Punitive damages, being a regulatory measure,
were viewed as coercive. According to many legal scholars, coercive elements be-
longed only in public law areas and had no place in private law areas. Id. See also
Morris, supra note 49, at 1177 n.7 (citing 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 n.2 (14th ed. 1883) (noting that punitive damages give the
plaintiff an "out and out windfall")).
56. Theodore Sedgwick, The Rule Of Damages In Actions Ex Delicto, 10 LAw REP.
49, 53 (1847) (hereinafter Sedgwick]. See also THEODORE SEDGWICK, SEDGWICK ON
DAMAGES §§ 353-54 (9th ed. 1912) (outlining and rebutting criticism to "exemplary
damages") [hereinafter SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES].
57. Sedgwick, supra note 56, at 53. Sedgwick believed that the distinction between
public and private law was unrealistic in practice. Id.
58. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1301 (citing examples of such cases).
59. Hart, supra note 15, at 586. This trend of accepting punitive damages has con-
tinued; currently, all but four states permit punitive damages. Galanter & Luban, su-
pra note 39, at 1407. Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Nebraska prohibit punitive dam-
ages altogether, and Michigan prohibits punitive damages in certain cases. Id. at 1407
n.62.
60. Hart, supra note 15, at 586.
61. Id. In the Nineteenth Century, the largest punitive damages award was worth
about $58,000 in 1987 dollars, and the largest total verdict, including compensatory
and punitive damages, was equal to $20,000 in actual dollars. Id.
62. Id. For example, from 1960 to 1984, the frequency of punitive damages verdicts
increased by 400% in San Francisco County, California and by 2000% in Cook County,
lllnois. Id. at 586 n.11. Furthermore, the average size of punitive damages awards in-
that the disparity between punitive damages and actual damages within
a given case has become increasingly larger. Much of this increase is
due to the expanding scope of punitive damages in many jurisdictions
beyond intentional, wilful and wanton, and outrageous conduct to in-
clude grossly negligent conduct as well.' The effect of this expansion
has been a marked increase in the incidence and size of punitive dam-
ages awards in business and contract cases.
creased by 2000% in San Francisco County. Id. Between 1976 and 1989, there were
507 punitive damages verdicts of $100,000 or more in California. Id. at 587. A 1992
American Tort Reform Association study revealed that the aggregate of punitive dam-
ages awards in California, Illinois, New York, and Texas totaled $312 million in the
period from 1988-91, up from $800,000 in 1968-71. Punitive Damages Soar: Study,
Bus. INS., Oct. 26, 1992, at 82. But see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and
Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 27 (1990) (suggesting that the data
.provide[s] little, if any, reliable evidence about the law in action with regard to
punitive damages"); Robert Prentice, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bar-
gaining Concept, 7 REv. LrlG. 113, 123 (1988) (recognizing that claims of "runaway
punitive damages" are exaggerated); Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform
Application of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for
Punitive Damage Reform, 40 UCLA L. REv. 753, 756 n.17 (1993) (arguing that al-
though very large awards are rare, such factual and empirical data is far less impor-
tant to the political process than public perception).
It is important to note that this dramatic increase in the size and frequency of
punitive damages awards over the last thirty-five years has occurred predominantly in
business and contract cases. Galanter & Luban, supra note 39, at 1416. Business and
contract cases grew more than any other type of case during this period. Id. Fur-
thermore, studies have concluded that corporate defendants are the most likely tar-
gets of large punitive damages awards. Brief for The Product Liability Advisory Coun-
cil, Inc., supporting Petitioner at 22, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2711 (No. 92479) [hereinafter Product Liability Advisory Council's Brief].
This helps explain the aforementioned increases.
63. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 579 (noting that "[tlhe specter of large
punitive damages awards has raised fears that these awards over and above hundreds
or thousands of compensatory damages awards will spell the financial ruin of [the]
corporations" against which they are assessed). But cf. Daniels & Martin, supra note
62, at 60-63 (arguing that the ratio of punitive damages and other damages has actu-
ally remained relatively stable over time).
64. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W. Va.
1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Neely, in his
majority opinion, wrote that "the punitive damages definition of malice has grown to
include . . . extremely negligent conduct that is likely to cause serious harm." Id.
65. Galanter & Luban, supra note 39, at 1415-17. "Between 1960 and 1986, torts
dropped from 38% of total federal court filings to 17%, while diversity contract mat-
ters increased from 8% to 13% of total filings. Contract cases in the federal courts
grew at a rate of 258% during this period, while torts grew at a rate of 113%." Id. at
1416 (citing Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal
Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 927, 942). See also supra
note 62 and accompanying text (citing the increase in business litigation as a cause
for the rise in punitive damages awards).
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1. Modem Rationales
Modernly, there are two primary rationales for punitive damages
awards.' The first rationale is that punitive damages are a form of
punishment for past conduct. 7 The second rationale is that punitive
damages deter people from future similar wrongs because of the risk of
having to pay money above and beyond the actual damages they
caused.' There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.'
Specific deterrence is designed to deter the particular tortfeasor from
future wrongful acts of a similar nature, while general deterrence is de-
signed to deter others similarly situated from similar wrongful con-
duct.7' Most jurisdictions rely on both rationales to justify the assess-
ment of punitive damages.7
2. The Modem Tort Reform Debate
The punitive damages debate that began in the Nineteenth Century
has, in the later part of the Twentieth Century, become increasingly
heated and political in nature.n As punitive damages awards have in-
66. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 801-02. Additional rationales include vindi-
cation, retribution, additional compensation for intangible damages, compensation for
plaintiffs attorney fees, and discouragement of anti-social behavior. Id.; Dorsey D.
Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1982); Daniels & Martin, supra note 62, at 7. For a detailed discussion of
the two primary rationales, see generally Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 40.
67. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 802-03. Some commentators believe that
punishment can only be justified as a rationale for punitive damages by its deterrent
effect on the defendant and others. Id. Furthermore, critics of this rationale argue
that punitive damages duplicate criminal punishment without important criminal law
procedural safeguards, such as a higher burden of proof and the right to remain
silent. Daniels & Martin, supra note 62, at 7-8.
68. Ellis, supra note 66, at 3.
69. James R. May, Fashioning Procedural and Substantive Due Process Arguments
in Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving Punitive Damages After Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 22 ENVTL. L. 573, 574 (1992). For a detailed analysis and
critique of the deterrence function, see generally Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and
Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL L
REV. 133, 137-143 (1982) [hereinafter Gary T. Schwartz].
70. May, supra note 69, at 574.
71. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 803 (noting that the two rationales are
sometimes combined, such that the "deterrent" effect of punitive damages is what
justifies "punishment" of the defendant).
72. Daniels & Martin, supra note 62, at 2. The tort reform movement has shifted
the punitive damages controversy from a debate over the doctrinal merits of punitive
creased both in size and frequency,' and as the disparity between pu-
nitive damages and actual damages has, in many cases, risen dramati-
cally,74 punitive damages critics have worked harder than ever toward
reforming the punitive damages system.75 This reform effort is part of a
larger movement to reform many procedural areas of the civil justice
system."6
Some tort reform proponents believe that the civil justice system is
out of control." They claim that punitive damages constrain big busi-
ness,' inequitably provide, plaintiffs with a windfall,' hamper the de-
velopment of beneficial products,' encourage needless litigation,"' dis-
courage settlement,' foster "runaway juries,"' and are too unpredict-
damages to a public policy debate. Id. See generally Demarest & Jones, supra note
28; Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 44, at 1370-72.
73. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
75. See generally Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L
REV. 1521 (1993) (discussing the tort reform movement in detail, focusing on the
1990s).
76. See Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992). Other
areas of proposed reform include encouraging voluntary dispute resolution processes,
limiting discovery, restricting expert witness testimony, and modifying the shifting of
attorney fees. Id.
77. Daniels & Martin, supra note 62, at 2. See also Teresa M. Schwartz, Punitive
Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1356 (1993) [hereinafter
Teresa M. Schwartz].
78. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1277. Tort reformers have been criticized
for seeking to reform only civil justice provisions that "impede the activities of eco-
nomic elites." Id.
79. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 626.
The concern is not so much with the fact that the defendant is assessed a
large financial penalty for its willful or wanton conduct; rather, the concern
is that the awarding of such multi-million dollar punitive awards to a plaintiff
becomes tantamount to that plaintiff and his lawyer winning the lottery,
which does not fulfill the public's interest in such awards.
Id.
80. Stacy Adler, High Courts Review Punitive Damages; Justices to Consider
Award Limits, Bus. INS., Oct. 1, 1990, at 1. For a detailed discussion of the proposed
reform on punitive damages for regulated products, see generally Teresa M. Schwartz,
supra note 77. But cf. Galanter & Luban, supra note 39, at 1416 (noting that, except
for asbestos cases, "federal product liability ... [litigation) is shrinking rather than
expanding"). For an argument that punitive damages do not hamper the production of
beneficial products, see generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28.
81. Bruce Keppel, Poll Backs Insurance Industry Priority; Public Wants Civil Suit
Reforms, Survey Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1987, § 4 (Business), at 2 (recognizing
Americans' belief that the civil justice system is overused).
82. Id. See also infra notes 406-09 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
impact of frequent and large punitive damages awards on a plaintiffs willingness to
settle).
83. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 805. Tort reformers argue that a major
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able and arbitrary.4 Many tort reformers cite a massive "litigation ex-
plosion"' and an "insurance crisis,"' occurring toward the latter half
of the Twentieth Century, as two major catalysts of the reform move-
ment,' and they cite punitive damages as the cause of these prob-
lems.'
In the Model State Punitive Damages Act, former Vice President Dan
Quayle set forth recommendations on how to reform the punitive dam-
ages system.8 The act recommended six reforms: (1) Eliminating ad
damnum clauses in punitive damages cases;' (2) raising the standard
of proof to clear and convincing evidence;' (3) requiring proof of mal-
problem with current punitive damages procedures is that jurors have almost com-
plete discretion in awarding punitive damages. Id. at 811-12. See generally Alan H.
Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment,
and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 160-83 (1991) (analyzing and
rebutting several arguments against the jury's current role in awarding punitive dam-
ages).
84. See Quayle, supra note 76, at 564 ("Lacking a unifying structure, the current
approach to punitive damages will continue to generate disproportionately high
awards in a random and capricious manner."). The lack of guidelines, both legislative
and judicial, has been cited as the main reason for the arbitrary assessment of puni-
tive damages. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 44, at 1370-71.
85. Danieis & Martin, supra note 62, at 3 n.9 (noting that although there has been
a "litigation explosion," its size has been exaggerated). For example, in federal courts
between 1960 and 1990, the number of lawsuits filed annually increased from 51,000
to 218,000. Quayle, supra note 76, at 560.
86. Daniels & Martin, supra note 62, at 3 n.9. See also SCHLUETER & REDDEN, su-
pra note 28, at 79 (discussing the effects of punitive damages on insurance costs).
But see Prentice, supra note 62, at 123 (noting that "reports of a litigation explo-
sion . . . have been greatly exaggerated, and the insurance crisis is, at least in part,
an invention of the insurance industry").
87. Danies & Martin, supra note 62, at 3.
88. Id.
89. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1277-82; MODEL STATE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ACT (Office of the Vice President 1992) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The statute was
introduced in a report entitled "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America" and was
proposed by the President's Council On Competitiveness. Rustad & Koenig, supra
note 28, at 1278 n.60. For an in depth discussion and analysis of the Model Act, see
id.
90. MODEL ACT, supra note 89, § 4(c). Some reformers argue that since punitive
damages are regulatory in nature, plaintiffs should not be allowed to plead specific
amounts of punitive damages. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1278 n.62. Plaintiffs
plead amounts of damages in ad damnum clauses. Id. See also Quayle, supra note
76, at 565 (arguing that "plaintiffs seeking punitive damages should not be able to
assign specific dollar amounts to their request").
91. MODEL AcT, supra note 89, § 6. Twenty-four states have invoked a clear and
ice or intent to cause serious harm;' (4) bifurcating trials, so that a
trial on punitive liability would precede a trial on punitive damages;'
(5) allowing only judge-determined punitive awards;' and (6) limiting
the punitive award to the amount of the total compensatory award.'
convincing evidence standard of proof for punitive damages. For a list of states and
authority for this requirement, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1278 n.63.
92. MODEL AcT, supra note 89, § 6. The proposal is that punitive damages not be
allowed in negligence cases, even gross negligence, because of the lack of a "quasi-
criminal" element. Id. See also Quayle, supra note 76, at 565 ("Because punitive dam-
ages are 'quasi-criminal,' an award should be predicated on a standard of proof re-
quiring some element of intent."); Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 827 (noting
that most jurisdictions only allow punitive damages for conscious disregard, which is
more than mere negligence, but less than criminal).
93. MODEL ACT, supra note 89, § 5(a)-(d). The first stage of the trial would involve
a determination of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of such dam-
ages. Id. During the second stage of the trial, which would only occur if the plaintiff
was awarded compensatory damages, the same jury would determine liability for
punitive damages. Id. This bifurcation would occur only at the defendant's request.
Id. The purpose behind this proposal is to prevent the wrongful contamination of the
jury's determination of compensatory liability by preventing the presentation of evi-
dence relevant only to the punitive issue until after the compensatory issue has been
decided. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1280 n.65.
94. MODEL ACT, supra note 89, § 5(f). This proposal is designed to prevent run-
away jury verdicts. Quayle, supra note 76, at 565. Furthermore, it would allow for
consideration of prior damage awards for the same tort, the effect of a punitive dam-
ages award on other potential plaintiffs, the deterrent effect of compensatory damag-
es, and possible criminal or administrative penalties against the defendant for the
same act. MODEL ACT, supra note 89, § 5(f). Three states, Connecticut, Kansas, and
Ohio, have enacted statutes that call for judge-assessed punitive damages. See
Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case For Reforming Punitive Damages Pro-
cedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 302 (1983) (favoring judge-assessed punitive damages).
However, the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[iun Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Some com-
mentators suggest that a tort reform measure that removes the punitive damages
determination from the jurisdiction of the jury might violate this seventh amendment
guarantee. See generally Scheiner, supra note 83 (discussing this Seventh Amendment
issue in detail).
95. MODEL ACT, supra note 89, § 7. There are three main types of caps on puni-
tive damages. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1281 n.67. The first, a fixed ratio
ceiling, allows punitive damages only to the extent that they do not exceed a speci-
fied ratio of compensatory damages. Id. This is the type proposed by the Model Act.
See MODEL AcT, supra note 89, § 7. The second, fixed amounts, sets an absolute
dollar amount as a cap on punitive damages. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at
1281 n.67. The third, a hybrid of the first two, sets a maximum dollar amount for
punitive damages and a fixed ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, but limits
punitive damages to the lesser of the two. Id. Several states have adopted cap mea-
sures. See, e.g., AIA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1987) (limiting punitive damages in cer-
tain cases to $250,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1988) (capping punitive
damages at three times the compensatory damages); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
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Other suggestions include giving some or all of the punitive damages to
the State' or abolishing punitive damages altogether. 7
E. Punitive Damages and the Constitution
Punitive damages have been challenged on constitutional grounds
several times within the past 100 years.' However, the number of con-
ANN. §§ 41.002-41.009 (West Supp. 1988) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of
$200,000 or four times the actual damages). For a detailed discussion of these and
similar measures, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 28, at 587-94. Other tort
reformers propose aggregate caps on damages awarded against any particular mass
tort defendant and caps expressed as a percentage of the defendant's net worth.
These proposals are designed to ensure that punitive damages would not put defen-
dants out of business. Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 824.
The concept of requiring penalties to be "proportionate" to the offense originated
in criminal law. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits sentences disproportionate to the crime), overruled by Harmelin
v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). This is reminiscent of the analogy often drawn
between criminal penalties and civil punitive damages. See supra note 44 (discussing
this analogy). Although the Eighth Amendment has been held inapplicable to punitive
damages, see infra notes 101, 128-30 and accompanying text, many petitioners and
tort reformers argue that this disproportionality argument should apply to punitive
damages. See, e.g., TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718, 2720; id. at 2732-33 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). See also infra note 208 (citing early cases that suggested proportionality
concepts for civil penalties).
96. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 626-27. This reform is designed to pre-
vent plaintiffs from receiving windfalls by virtue of the defendant's punishable con-
duct. Id. at 626. Thus, these reformers do not propose a cap on the amount of puni-
tive damages that can be assessed against a defendant, but a cap on the amount of
punitive damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff. Id. States that have enacted this
type of legislation include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, and Oregon. Id.
at 626-27. For a more detailed discussion of these statutes, see id. at 627.
This type of legislation raises a possible Eighth Amendment issue. See infra
notes 101, 128-30 and accompanying text. See also Maskin & Antonucci, supra note
12, at 628 (for a detailed discussion of constitutional challenges to the state statutes
listed above).
97. See Demarest & Jones, supra note 28, at 823. Some tort reformers believe that
the punitive damages system has become so corrupt that total abolition is the only
alternative. Id. Furthermore, they believe that the functions of punishment and deter-
rence should be left to the criminal justice system. Id. at 816. Tort reformers in
favor of the abolition of punitive damages are criticized for considering only the
amount of the awards and ignoring the fact that abolition would leave outrageous
conduct that did not reach criminal levels unpunished. Id. at 823.
98. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 587. See, e.g., Louis Pizitz Dry Goods
Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927) (holding that a state statute authorizing puni-
tive damages against a principal based on the negligence of his agent did not violate
stitutional challenges has increased tremendously in recent years in the
wake of the politically charged tort reform movement.' Such challeng-
es have most commonly been based on first amendment concerns re-
lated to libel cases,'" the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment,'0 ' and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 2 which was the basis of TXO's challenge." Until very recent-
ly, the Supreme Court had declined to respond to due process challeng-
es similar to the one asserted by TXO." ° Before surveying a few of the
due process); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (noting that
"juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary
relation to the actual harm caused"), appeal afler remand, 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.
1982), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
99. The tort reform movement, and specifically the effort to reform punitive dam-
ages, has been active for several decades, picking up steam as the years have gone
by. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1275-84; Tobias, supra note 75,
at 1522-26. It seems that as tort reformers have pushed harder, expressing strong
dissatisfaction with the present punitive damages system, there have been more con-
stitutional challenges to punitive damages. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment
on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986) (noting
that "punitive damages are out of control" and, therefore, should be "more vulnerable
to constitutional attack"). Additionally, as there has been an increase in constitutional
challenges, tort reformers have been induced to fight harder for punitive damages
limitations. Id. The idea that constitutional challenges and tort reform feed each other
seems a bit circular, but it does appear to be the trend. For a discussion of many
recent constitutional challenges to punitive damages, see infra notes 117-53 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the tort reform movement, see supra notes 72-
97 and accompanying text.
100. Olson & Boutrous, supra note 44, at 909. For a detailed discussion of first
amendment challenges to punitive damages, see generally SCHLUETER & REDDEN, SU-
pra note 28, at 45-49; Donald B. Petrie, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Con-
stitution After Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 739
(1990).
101. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the only eighth
amendment excessive fines challenge to punitive damages that the Supreme Court has
ever reviewed). The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive ball shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. In 1989, the Supreme Court held that large punitive damages
awards do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Dispos-
al, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the Browning-Ferris
decision, see Gary T. Schwartz, supra note 69, at 1237. For an in depth discussion of
eighth amendment issues related to punitive damages, see generally Olson &
Boutrous, supra note 44; Jeffries, supra note 99, at 139.
102. See infra notes 117-53 and accompanying text (discussing several such chal-
lenges). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a more in depth discussion of the due
process concept generally, see infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
103. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2714 (1993).
104. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 588.
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recent Supreme Court cases dealing with due process challenges, it is
necessary to take a brief look at the concept of due process and why it
has potential implications in the punitive damages area.
1. Due Process
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." " The primary concept behind due process is a
policy of fundamental fairness." Over the years, two main compo-
nents of due process have emerged: substantive due process and proce-
dural due process. 7 Because these concepts, as well as their relation-
ship to punitive damages, are so different,"° they are addressed indi-
vidually.
a. Substantive due process
The substantive due process issue regarding punitive damages may be
stated as follows: at, what point, if any, will the size of the award be-
come so "grossly excessive" in relation to the defendant's conduct as to
constitute an unlawful deprivation of property and violate the due pro-
cess clause?" Generally, substantive due process provides standards
against which governmental actions, including jury verdicts, are to be
scrutinized."' The Court will judge governmental actions that impact
fundamental rights.. with a higher level of scrutiny than actions that
105. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
106. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (suggesting that funda-
mental fairness is a very basic element of procedural due process), overruled on
other grounds by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
107. May, supra note 69, at 576. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text for
a brief discussion of the substantive and procedural components of due process.
108. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. Substantive due process focuses
on whether the actual deprivation is constitutional, while procedural due process
focuses on whether the procedures involved in the deprivation were sufficient to
survive constitutional attack. May, supra note 69, at 576.
109. Jeffries, supra note 99, at 140; May, supra note 69, at 576.
110. Id.
111. Fundamental rights are non-economic individual rights expressed in the Bill of
Rights, plus other individual rights implied by the Supreme Court, such as family,
marriage, and child rearing. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 'more exacting judicial scrutiny" when legislation "appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten Amendments"). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131
do not impact fundamental rights."' This continuum of scrutiny re-
volves around a nucleus of reasonableness, an abstract standard that
requires weighing all of the relevant factors in deciding whether the
governmental action was "reasonable.""'
b. Procedural due process
The procedural due process issue regarding punitive damages centers
on whether the procedures involved in awarding punitive damages,
including jury instructions, post-trial review, appellate review, and bur-
den of proof, satisfy the due process requirements for depriving the
plaintiff of his property."4 Generally, procedural due process sets forth
what procedures are required in order to constitutionally deprive peo-
ple of life, liberty, or property."5 Often, the determination of whether
(1989) (holding that the right to rear children is fundamental); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is fundamental); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) (holding that familial rights are "fun-
damental" in nature and are entitled to the stricter scrutiny contemplated in Carolene
Products).
112. For an in depth discussion of substantive due process, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 434-55, 564-576 (1978). In the early 1900s, in an era
known as the Lochner-era, named after the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), governmental actions were judged based on a pure reasonableness standard.
See TRIBE, supra, at 435. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court rejected the reasonableness
analysis as too abstract and substituted two more concrete tests: rational basis and
strict scrutiny. Id at 450-51. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (suggesting for
the first time that two separate standards should be adopted). The rational basis test
would be applied to governmental actions that did not affect fundamental rights and
would presume that the governmental action was valid unless the opponent could
prove that the action was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objec-
tive. Id. at 153-54 (adhering to Justice Harlan's suggestion in Lochner that economic
legislation must only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective).
Strict scrutiny would be applied to governmental actions that denied fundamental
rights and would presume that the governmental action was invalid unless the gov-
ernment could prove that the action was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest. Id. at 153 n.4 (requiring stricter scrutiny for non-economic legislation
that impacted fundamental rights).
113. During the latter half of the Twentieth Century, there has been a trend back
toward a reasonableness standard in assessing certain governmental actions that can-
not easily be placed into one of the aforementioned categories. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (applying a reasonableness standard in
assessing the impact of governmental intrusions on a woman's right to have an abor-
tion); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (applying a reasonable-
ness test in assessing the right to die). Because the concept of reasonableness is
quite subjective and difficult to define, it is helpful when the Court sets forth factors
to assist other courts in applying this standard.
114. Olson & Boutrous, supra note 44, at 923.
115. For an in depth discussion of procedural due process, see generally TRIBE,
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certain procedures are required is based on a balancing of the burdens
these procedures place on the system against the benefits these proce-
dures confer upon individuals.11
2. Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damages
a. First signs of Supreme Court interest in due process issues
regarding punitive damages
The first time the Supreme Court chose to consider the interplay
between due process and punitive damages was in 1986, in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie."7 The Aetna Life case originated in Alabama
and involved claims of bad faith against an insurance company."' Al-
though the Court noted "that the lack of sufficient standards governing
punitive damages awards in Alabama violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,""9 the Court expressly reserved this
important issue for a more "appropriate setting."20
In 1988, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to puni-
tive damages in the case of Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw.'21 The Bankers Life case involved the denial of a claim for
supra note 112, at 501-63; Michael J. King, Note, Punitive Damages and Due Process:
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip, 25 CREIGHTON L REV. 323, 331-35
(1991); R. McKenna Richards, Jr., Note, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip:
Punitive Damages and the Modern Meaning of Procedural Due Process, 70 N.C. L
REV. 1361 (1992).
116. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1976).
117. 475 U.S. 813 (1986). For more detailed discussions of Aetna Life, see Olson &
Boutrous, supra note 44, at 909; May, supra note 69, at 578; Hart, supra note 15, at
588.
It is important to note that as early as the beginning of the Twentieth Century,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that criminal penalties should be limited to the
gravity of the offense. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. TXO argued that
these criminal penalties are analogous to punitive damages and, thus, punitive damag-
es should also be limited. Id.
118. Aetna Life, 475 U.S. at 820.
119. Id. at 828.
120. Id. at 828-29. The Court, finding that this case was "inappropriate" for a con-
sideration of the due process issues surrounding the punitive damages award, did not
decide the issue at all. Id. See also Hart, supra note 15, at 588.
121. 486 U.S. 71, 73 (1988). The Bankers Life case originated in Mississippi. Id. For
a more in depth discussion of Bankers Life, see Olson & Boutrous, supra note 44, at
909-10; May, supra note 69, at 578; Hart, supra note 15, at 588; Maskin & Antonucci,
supra note 12, at 588-89.
the accidental loss of a limb.n The jury verdict was $20,000 in actual
damages and $1.6 million in punitive damages."n
While the Court noted the importance of due process issues regard-
ing punitive damages,'? the Court again left these issues unresolved,
this time based on jurisdictional grounds.'25 However, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, which was joined in by Justice Scalia,
provided some insight as to their position on the issue.' Justice
O'Connor wrote, "Mississippi law gives juries discretion to award any
amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a defendant acts
with a certain mental state. In my view, because of the punitive charac-
ter of such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the
Due Process Clause."
27
In 1989, in Brouming-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits between private parties."
Again the Court avoided the due process issues, this time based upon
the inappropriateness of reviewing issues not considered by either the
trial court or the appellate court."3 However, in upholding the jury
verdict of $51,146 in actual damages and $6 million in punitive damages,
122. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 73-76. See also Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12,
at 588 (detailing the facts of Bankers Life).
123. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 75.
124. Id. at 76.
125. Id. (refusing to reach the due process issues because such issues "were not
raised and passed upon in state court").
126. Id. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Olson & Boutrous, supra note
44, at 909-10 (discussing the rationale of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion).
127. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor con-
tinued, "Punitive damages are not measured against actual injury, so there is no ob-
jective standard that limits their amount. Hence, 'the impact of these windfall recov-
eries is unpredictable and potentially substantial.' . . . [Tlhe Court should scrutinize
carefully the procedures under which punitive damages are awarded in civil lawsuits."
Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.
42, 50 (1979)). See also Hart, supra note 15, at 588 (noting Justice O'Connor's inter-
est in the due process issues regarding punitive damages); Maskin & Antonucci, su-
pra note 12, at 590 (providing a more detailed discussion of Justice O'Connor's com-
ments on the due process issues regarding punitive damages).
128. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
129, Id. at 280. Browning-Ferris arose out of an antitrust violation and an interfer-
ence with contract action. Id. at 260-62. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at 258. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion,
which was joined in by Justice Marshall. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
and dissenting opinion, which was joined in by Justice Stevens. Id. See supra note
101 (providing sources that discuss Browning-Ferris and the Eighth Amendment in
more detail).
130. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77.
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the Court, in dictum, noted that excessive awards might be subject to
due process review and acknowledged the importance of these is-
sues. 1
3
Although the Court in Browning-Ferris did not resolve the due pro-
cess issues, several Justices took an interest in the potential due pro-
cess issues for the first. time."'2 In a concurring opinion Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote, "Without... standards for
the determination of how large an award of punitive damages is appro-
priate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves ..... " Jus-
tice Brennan expressed concern that a jury instruction allowing consid-
eration of the defendant's character, financial position, and the nature
of the defendant's conduct in determining the punitive damages award,
provides the jury with very little guidance and basically allows the ju-
rors to "do what they think is best.""u
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, which
was joined in by Justice Stevens, reiterated the concerns she raised in
Bankers Life."3M She noted that giving juries vague guidelines regarding
punitive damages is akin to giving them "unbridled discretion," which
may raise procedural due process issues."M Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court's decision in Browning-Ferris did not
foreclose future due process challenges to punitive damages.'37 With
that statement, Justice O'Connor provided an invitation for such a chal-
lenge in the future.
131. Id. See also Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 590-91.
132. Hart, supra note 15, at 589. In Browning-Ferris, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
O'Connor, and Stevens addressed the idea of potential due process issues regarding
punitive damages. Id.
133. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that
"(gluidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all .... I for one would
look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages based on such skeletal guid-
ance than I would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which responsi-
ble officials had deliberated and then agreed." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
135. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (noting Justice O'Connor's con-
cerns in the Bankers Life case).
136. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice O'Connor stated, "I adhere to my comments in [Bankers Life] regarding the
vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by juries given unbridled
discretion to impose punitive damages." Id.
137. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Hart, supra note 15, at
589 (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion).
b. The first appropriate case to consider due process of
punitive damages
The Supreme Court finally found the long-awaited and largely invited
"appropriate case" in 1990 when it granted review to Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.' This Alabama case involved an insur-
ance agent who fraudulently appropriated a client's employee health
insurance premiums and failed to notify the client that its insurance
had lapsed." As a result, Mrs. Haslip, an employee of the insured cli-
ent, faced a collection action for her medical bills." The jury found in
Mrs. Haslip's favor and awarded her $200,000 in actual damages and
$840,000 in punitive damages. 4' The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the substantive and procedural due process challenges to
the punitive damages award. Ultimately, the Court rejected both chal-
lenges and upheld the award."
Based upon substantive due process grounds, the appellant argued
that the award was so grossly excessive that it offended constitutional
sensibilities.4 ' The Court held that although punitive damages do have
substantive due process limits, no "mathematical bright line" could be
drawn to distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional puni-
tive damages award amounts.'" However, the Court did indicate that a
punitive damages award that is four times the actual damages award
"may be close to the line."'" In this case, the Court upheld the award
because they found that it did not cross this undefined constitutional
line. 4' Justice O'Connor dissented, concluding that the award did
cross the line. 47 Justices Kennedy and Scalia each wrote separate con-
138. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). This was the first time that a majority of the Court ac-
knowledged that there are due process constraints on punitive damages. Maskin &
Antonucci, supra note 12, at 593. For more detailed discussions of Haslip, see gen-
erally Richards, supra note 115; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 593-99;
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1273-74, 1311-18; King, supra note 115.
139. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4-6.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id. at 6 n.2.
142. Id. at 24.
143. Id. at 23-24.
144. Id. at 18; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 593-94. Justice Scalia wrote a
separate opinion, concurring in the judgment, stating his belief that punitive damages
have no substantive due process limitations because the Constitution does not explic-
itly or implicitly grant a "fundamental right" to punitive damages. Haslip, 499 U.S. at
24-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 23. Several subsequent cases used this statement as an implied rule. For
a discussion of such cases, see infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
146. Hastip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
147. Id. at 64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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curring opinions, both concluding that punitive damages do not impli-
cate substantive due process.48
Based upon procedural due process grounds, the appellant next ar-
gued that the procedures employed by the state of Alabama failed con-
stitutional scrutiny."'4 The Court held that a state's procedure for
awarding punitive damages passes constitutional muster if it provides
"meaningful constraints" on the fact finder's discretion.'" The Court
then upheld the punitive damages award because it found that
Alabama's procedures provided adequate procedural safeguards, such
as jury instructions, which serve as a reasonable constraint on jury dis-
cretion, post-trial review, and adequate appellate review.'"' Justice
O'Connor dissented,"s stating that she would have reversed the puni-
tive damages award because she believed that Alabama's procedures for
awarding punitive damages were unconstitutionally vague."
148. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 7-8.
150. Id. at 22. The Court upheld Alabama's procedures for reviewing punitive dam-
ages awards, which included the following factors:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as
the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness,
any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct;
(c) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desir-
ability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a
loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litiga-
tion; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its con-
duct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil
awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in
mitigation.
Id. at 21-22. For further discussion of these factors, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note
28, at 1311-18.
151. Id. at 19-23. For a detailed discussion of the procedures upheld in Haslip, see
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. Hastip, 499 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's response to the jury in-
struction was that "it speaks of discretion, but suggests no criteria on which to base
the exercise of that discretion." Id. at 44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
continued, "Instead of reminding the jury that its decision must rest on a factual or
legal predicate, the instruction suggests that the jury may do whatever it 'feels' like.
It invites individual jurors to rely upon emotion, bias, and personal predilections of
every sort." Id. at 44-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
c. In the aftermath of Haslip
Although the Supreme Court finally made a statement regarding due
process considerations of punitive damages," the statement did not
provide much guidance to lower courts in assessing whether punitive
damages awards satisfy due process." The Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that the punitive damages award in Haslip, while not crossing the
line into the realm of constitutional impropriety, was "close to the
line,"M begged the question, exactly where is the line to be drawn."7
While the Court explicitly referred to the existence of this "line," they
seemingly left the rest to the imagination. M
Several other cases were pending review by the Supreme Court at the
time Haslip was decided." In all of these cases, the Court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case to the lower courts for further
consideration in light of the Haslip decision." A brief look at these
lower court opinions on remand, as well as other appellate court deci-
sions regarding due process punitive damages issues, reveals that the
Haslip decision provided no rhyme nor reason for determining when
punitive damages awards meet due process requirements and when
they do not.'
For example, some lower courts based their decisions of due process
issues regarding large punitive damages awards on the egregiousness of
the defendant's conduct.M Other courts based such determinations
154. Id. at 23. See also supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
155. Charles D. Stewart & Philip G. Piggot, Punitive Damages Since Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 693, 696-97 (1993).
156. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
157. Hart, supra note 15, at 601.
158. Stewart & Piggot, supra note 155, at 696-97 (noting that while the Hastip ma-
jority recognized the existence of constitutional limits on punitive damages, they left
.many unanswered questions," including where the constitutional line is to be drawn).
159. Id. at 698. For a list of these cases, see infra note 160.
160. Id. Cases granted review, but remanded, include: Fleming Landfill, Inc. v.
Games, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Koire, 111 S.
Ct. 2253 (1991); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991);
AMCA Int'l Fin. Co. v. Hilgedick, 499 U.S. 972 (1991); Pacific Lighting Corp. v. MGW,
Inc., 499 U.S. 915 (1991); Portec, Inc. v. Post Office, 499 U.S. 915 (1991); Internation-
al Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. George, 499 U.S. 914 (1991); Hospital Auth. v.
Jones, 499 U.S. 914 (1991); Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 499 U.S. 914
(1991); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
161. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 1991)
(upholding large punitive damages award against an insurer because the fraud was
egregious). The court indicated its willingness to uphold large punitive damages
awards where such awards were justified by the facts. Id. at 858. For more a more
detailed discussion of Southern Life, see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 601-
04.
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upon whether large punitive damages awards were rationally related to
the "legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence."'" Several courts
suggested that Haslip did not mandate an analysis of the proportional-
ity between compensatory and punitive damages when considering due
process issues." Some courts overturned punitive damages awards,
holding that the procedural safeguards employed in awarding such
damages did not comport with the requirements set forth in Haslip.
The wide range of outcomes in these cases indicates that Haslip failed
to set a definite standard regarding when, in the face of due process
challenges, punitive damages awards should or should not be upheld.
When the Supreme Court granted review to TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., many practitioners hoped that the Court
would use this opportunity to set forth clear standards for punitive
damages determination and provide guidance to lower courts." The
163. See, e.g., Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, 598 So. 2d 886, 891 (Ala.)
(upholding a large punitive damages award against an insurance company that accept-
ed premiums on a void policy because the award bore a rational relationship to the
deterrence and punishment goals of punitive damages), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 200
(1992). For a more in depth treatment of Lindblom, see Stewart & Piggot, supra
note 155, at 705-06.
164. See, e.g., Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501, 504 (Ga. 1991) (upholding a
punitive damages award substantially higher than the nominal damages award), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377,
1382 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a disproportionately large punitive damages award
against an insurance company for wrongful denial of a health insurance claim and
concluding that the "size of an award of punitive damages and the relationship be-
tween the award and the amount of compensatory damages are relevant factors in
determining whether the award is constitutional, but these factors are not disposi-
tive-).
165. See, e.g., Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 907-08 (W. Va. 1991)
(overturning a substantial punitive damages award against a solid waste disposal facil-
ity because the trial court's method of reviewing punitive damages was too unrestric-
tive and, therefore, violated due process); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d
95, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing a large punitive damages award because the trial
court failed to use meaningful standards); Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408
(4th Cir. 1992) (refusing to uphold a large punitive damages award because the jury
instruction regarding punitive damages was too open-ended); Alexander & Alexander,
Inc. v. Evander & Assoc., 596 A.2d 687, 721-22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (vacating a
substantial punitive damages award and remanding the case for retrial in light of
Haslip requirements), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992). For a detailed discussion
of these and other related cases, see generally Stewart & Piggot, supra note 155, at
698-708; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 12, at 606-20.
166. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
TXO decision was one of the most greatly anticipated in the 1993
term. 1
67
d. West Virginia punitive damages procedure
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the United States Su-
preme Court decision in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., it is necessary to briefly outline the history of West Virginia's
punitive damages determination methods.
Until Haslip, West Virginia, not unlike many other jurisdictions, left
much of the determination of punitive damages awards to jury discre-
tion." However, Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., a West Virginia
case to which the United States Supreme Court granted review, but
remanded in light of Haslip,7 ° changed this procedure dramati-
cally. '7 Games involved a nuisance action against a solid waste dis-
posal facility. The jury did not award the plaintiffs any compensato-
ry damages, but they awarded $105,000 in punitive damages. The de-
fendant appealed the constitutionality of the punitive damages award to
the West Virginia Supreme Court, but that court denied review.'74 The
case ventured on to the United States Supreme Court, where the case
was remanded to the state supreme court for consideration in light of
Haslip.
75
167. Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4. Some other high profile cases from this term
included: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2461, 2468-69 (1993)
(holding that public schools may provide sign language interpreters for students at-
tending religious schools); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753,
768 (1993) (holding that federal civil rights legislation may not be used to keep abor-
tion protesters from blockading health clinics); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at
2130, 2138-39 (1993) (holding that a police officer may seize contraband felt through
a suspect's clothing during a routine weapon search).
168. See, e.g., Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 381 S.E.2d 367, 375-76 (W. Va.
1989) (allowing the plaintiffs to amend their ad damnum clause upward from
$200,000 to $500,000 in order to conform with the jury's punitive damages award of
$500,000 without reviewing the punitive damages award for "reasonableness"); Jarvis
v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 406 S.E.2d 736, 743 (W. Va. 1991) (upholding a punitive
damages award because there was no particular reason not to, noting that this "test"
was subjective); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880-81 (W. Va. 1982) (upholding a
$10,000 punitive damages award where no compensatory damages were awarded),
overruled by Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
169. 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va 1991).
170. Id. For a list of other cases remanded in light of Haslip, see supra note 160.
171. See Stewart & Piggot, supra note 155, at 699-700; Maskin & Antonucci, supra
note 12, at 611-13. See also infra note 178 and accompanying text.
172. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 900.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Fleming Landfill, Inc. v. Games, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991).
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On remand, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the punitive
damages award, concluding that the trial court's method for determin-
ing punitive damages awards violated due process."' The court held
that the lack of state judicial and statutory standards and the unrestric-
tive nature of the trial court's determination of punitive damages was
inconsistent with the Haslip Court's call for clearer standards.' Thus,
the court set forth more concrete standards to aid trial courts in deter-
mining punitive damages awards, including: (1) whether the punitive
damages are reasonably related to actual damages, (2) the
reprehensibility and time involvement of the defendant's conduct, (3)
whether the defendant profited from his wrongful conduct, (4) the
amount of compensatory damages, (5) the wealth of the defendant, (6)
the costs of litigation, and (7) any other civil or criminal sanctions al-
ready imposed against the defendant for the same conduct. 8
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. was the first due
process challenge to punitive damages since Games that the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reviewed." The court relied heavily on the
Games decision inupholding the $10 million punitive damages award,
which was 526 times the actual damages."
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of the Case
The case began in 1984, when TXO's geologists discovered that ex-
tracting oil and gas from beneath a large tract of land called "Blevins
176. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 901-02. The court noted that although punitive damages
were necessary in some situations to deter defendants from future similar acts,
"[u]nchecked punitive damages awards ... can have effects that are detrimental to
society as a whole." Id. at 902.
177. Id. at 905.
178. Id. at 909-11.
179. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 W. Va
(1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
180. See id. at 877. The court did not employ a strict application of Games, reason-
ing that if they did, too many punitive damages awards would be remanded and
judicial efficiency would be sacrificed. Id. at 886. However, in light of Games and
Haslip, the court promised an "especially diligent" review of punitive damages
awards. Id. For a detailed discussion of the court's rationale, see infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
Tract" would be quite profitable for the company.' Therefore, TXO
decided that it would work hard to acquire the rights from Alliance in
order "to develop the oil and gas resources" on this tract of land."
TXO presented an offer to Alliance whereby, in exchange for these
valuable rights, TXO would pay Alliance twenty dollars per acre, twen-
ty-two percent of the revenues in royalties, and TXO would pay all of
the development costs." Alliance accepted this offer, which was con-
tingent upon the outcome of a title examination; if TXO determined that
the title had failed, Alliance would have to reimburse TXO for any con-
sideration paid."s
While checking the Blevins Tract chain of title, TXO found a 1958
deed in which Tug Fork, a predecessor in interest to Alliance, conveyed
the right to mine coal to another party, Mr. Signaigo, but expressly
reserved for itself "all the oil and gas underlying."" In July 1985,
knowing that such a claim was frivolous, TXO informed Alliance that its
leasehold title to the oil and gas development rights had probably failed
due to a cloud on titleT TXO made two attempts to prove this frivo-
lous claim."7 First, TXO tried unsuccessfully to convince Mr. Signaigo
to sign a pre-printed affidavit, which falsely indicated that oil and gas
rights might have been included in the 1958 deed.' Second, TXO paid
Virginia Crews, a successor in interest to Mr. Signaigo, to convey what-
ever interest it had in the land to TXO by executing a quitclaim deed,
which TXO recorded without informing Alliance."
181. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct 2711, 2715 (1993).
182. Id. A company called Tug Fork managed Blevins Tract until 1984, when Tug
Fork leased the oil and gas rights to a company called Georgia Fuels, which in turn
assigned the lease to Alliance. TXO, 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992) at 875.
183. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2715. TXO's offer, which Alliance thought to be "phenome-
nal," was a counter to an original offer presented by Alliance in late 1984, which
TXO rejected, despite its more favorable terms. TXO, 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992) at
875. For the terms of this original offer, see id.
184, TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2715. For the relevant text of the agreement between TXO
and Alliance, see Id. at 2715 n.2.
185. Id. at 2715.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2716; TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 876. In fact, Mr. Signaigo actual-
ly told TXO that the 1958 deed did not include oil and gas rights prior to TXO pre-
senting him with the affidavit. Id. For the pertinent contents of the affidavit, see id.
For the pertinent language of the deed, see id. For the full text of the deed, see id.
at 890-94, Appendix A.
189. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716. At first, TXO tried to convince Virginia Crews that
the oil and gas rights were included in the interest that Virginia Crews owned. Id.
When this approach failed, TXO decided to purchase any and all rights that Virginia
Crews owned, in order to assert the same false claim that the oil and gas rights
were included. Id.
[Vol. 21: 909, 19941 Walking the Invisible Line
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
On July 12, 1985, after recording the quitclaim deed, TXO informed
Alliance that TXO had probably obtained the oil and gas development
rights from Virginia Crews by virtue of this deed." In August, TXO




When the negotiations failed, TXO sought a declaratory judgment, an
action that Alliance met with a counterclaim for slander of title." On
TXO's claim, the trial court found that the quitclaim deed did not con-
vey the oil and gas rights to TXO.", A jury tried Alliance's counter-
claim and returned a verdict against TXO for $19,000 in actual damages
and $10 million in punitive damages.'" The court denied TXO's post-
trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remitti-
tur.
TXO appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court on three bases: the
first two involved state law issues and the third argued that the punitive
damages award violated the Due Process Clause." In response to the
third issue, the court applied the "reasonable relationship" test that it
espoused in Garnes." This test requires consideration of: "'(1) the po-
tential harm that TXO's actions could have caused; (2) the malicious-
ness of TXO's actions; and (3) the penalty necessary to discourage TXO
from undertaking such endeavors in the future." 7 In holding that
TXO's actions met this test, the court stated that TXO's intentionally
fraudulent conduct could potentially cause great harm to others, was
extremely reprehensible, and warranted a large punitive award to deter
TXO from such conduct in the future.'" The United States Supreme
190. Id. TXO did not inform Alliance of a possible title problem until after record-
ing this deed. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The trial court bifurcated the action. TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 877.
193. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716 & n.8.
194. Id. at 2716-17.
195. Id. at 2717.
196. Id. See also supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Games
.reasonable relationship" test).
197. Id. at 2718 (quoting TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 889).
198. Id. (quoting TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 888-89). In examining punitive
damages opinions, the West Virginia Supreme Court split defendants into two main
categories: (1) really stupid and (2) really mean. TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at
888-89. In fact, the court set forth a third category as well, but discussion of such is
Court granted review to consider the due process challenges to the pu-
nitive damages award."
IV. ANALYSIS OF TXO V. ALLIANCE
In TXO, a majority of the Supreme Court denied TXO's substantive
due process challenge, ruling that no mathematical bright line can be
drawn between punitive damages awards that adhere to due process
and those that violate due process.'s This majority, however, was
splintered into three separate opinions."° The first and second each
advocated what they believed to be the proper analysis for substantive
due process limits on punitive damages awards.'c The third concluded
that punitive damages have no substantive due process limits.' Addi-
tionally, a majority of the Court held that even punitive damages
awards that are 526 times the corresponding actual damages award may
be upheld if the facts warrant the award and if the lower court employs
adequate procedures.' °
inapplicable here. See id. at 888.
The court explained that punitive damages should be allowed against "really
stupid" defendants, those who are extremely careless, so that plaintiffs have "a sword
with which to fight well-armored, bureaucratic defendants." Id. However, the court
believed that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages should be
capped at "roughly five to one." Id. at 889 (emphasis added). However, for "really
mean" defendants, those who act intentionally, the punitive damages ratio need not
be so restrictive. Id. For example, in this particular "really mean defendant" case,
even a punitive damages award 526 times the compensatory damages award was
found to be within constitutional boundaries. Id. at 889-90.
199. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719.
200. This majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy,
Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas. Id. at 2715, 2720; id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 2713. The first was the plurality opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
which was joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens. Id. The second
was Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
third was Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, which was joined in by Justice Thomas.
Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
202. Justice Stevens set forth one method of analysis in the plurality opinion that
he authored. Id. at 2718-19. Justice Kennedy set forth a second method of analysis in
his concurring opinion. Id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that there is no substantive
due process right that punitive damages be reasonable. Id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
204. This majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy,
Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas. Id. at 2723; id. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id.
at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In response to TXO's procedural due process challenge, a majority
concluded that West Virginia's procedures for determining and review-
ing punitive damages awards were adequate.' However, the majority
was again split, this time into two groups, each with its own reason-
ing.20
6
A third group dissented on both the substantive and procedural due
process issues, concluding that while there are substantive and proce-
dural due process limitations regarding punitive damages, the award in
this case did not fall within those limitations. °7
A. Plurality Opinion
1. Substantive Due Process
Justice Stevens first examined several past opinions in which a ma-
jority of the Court had recognized that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "imposes substantive limits 'beyond which
penalties may not go."'2 The plurality noted that "plainly arbitrary and
oppressive" penalties have been held violative of substantive due pro-
cess."s In response to the respondents' argument, discounting these
cases as "'Lochner-era precedents,' 2.0 the plurality reasoned that these
205. This was the same majority that denied the substantive due process challenge
and consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Scalia,
Stevens, and Thomas. Id. at 2722 (1993); id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id.
at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. The first group included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kenne-
dy, and Stevens. Id. at 2723-24; id. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The second
group included Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White joined in this opinion, and
Justice Souter joined in part. Id.
208. Id. at 2718. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)
(upholding the penalty, but recognizing that "there are limits beyond which penalties
may not go . . . "); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491
(1915) (setting aside the penalty, finding it "arbitrary and oppressive" with regards to
due process because the defendant had acted in good faith); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (noting that state penalties may be reviewable if "the
fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law"). Although some of these penalties were upheld, these
cases represent the Court's early recognition that such penalties could and would be
overturned if they crossed an undefined constitutional line.
209. See supra note 208 and accompanying text
210. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718 (citing Respondent's Brief at 17-18, TXO (No. 92-479)).
For an historical background on Lochner, see supra note 112.
decisions still had weight given that the Lochner dissenters joined in
the majority opinions. " ' Thus, the plurality reached its first conclu-
sion: punitive damages do have substantive due process limits.2"
a. Standard of review
Having decided that there are substantive due process limits on puni-
tive damages, Justice Stevens next discussed the level of scrutiny
against which punitive damages awards should be judged."3 The re-
spondents argued that punitive damages awards should generally be
upheld, provided they are rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose, such as deterrence and punishment of wrongful conduct."4
They reasoned that punitive damages are similar to state economic
legislation and, thus, are entitled to the same presumption of validi-
ty.2"5 The petitioner argued that a strict scrutiny test that includes
"4'objective' criteria"2 "6 should be applied in determining whether puni-
tive damages awards presumptively violate the due process notion of
"fundamental fairness."2"7 The petitioner reasoned that because puni-
tive damages are assessed without guidance from elected legislators,
they warrant stricter scrutiny than other legislative penalties. 8
Despite the parties' desire to create a concrete test against which to
judge the substantive due process of punitive damages awards, the
plurality rejected both parties' arguments."' Justice Stevens reasoned
211. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718-19. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65
(1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Joining in Justice Harlan's dissent were Justices
Holmes, White, and Day. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). All of these Justices joined with
the majority in all of the cases at supra note 208, except that Justice Harlan died
prior to the decision in Southwestern Tel., 238 U.S. at 482. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719
n.19.
212. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719. Justice Scalia disagreed. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., con-
curring); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S 1, 24 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring). See also infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text (discussing in
detail the Haslip decision and that majority's conclusion that punitive damages have
substantive due process limits).
213. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The petitioner argued that the Court should consider objective criteria, such
as "(1) awards of punitive damages upheld against other defendants in the same
jurisdiction, (2) awards upheld for similar conduct in other jurisdictions, (3) legisla-
tive penalty decisions with respect to similar conduct, and (4) the relationship of pri-
or punitive awards to the associated compensatory awards." Id. (citing Petitioners
Brief at 16, TXO (No. 92-479)).
217. Id. The petitioner, relying upon Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (1991),
argued that "fundamental fairness" requires the use of concrete indicators. Id. (citing
Petitioners Brief at 15-16, 7XO (No. 92-479)).
218. Id. (citing Petitioners Brief at 13-14, TXO (No. 92-479)).
219. Id. The outcome angered many commentators who were hoping that the Court
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that the respondents' rational basis test was too broad in that it allowed
any punitive damages award amount as long as it deterred and pun-
ished wrongful conduct."
In rejecting strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review, the
plurality reasoned that the petitioner's analogy of jury awards to legisla-
tion was not sufficient to warrant this heightened scrutiny." The plu-
rality also expressed concern about the appropriateness of using the
petitioner's suggested objective criteria to assess the substantive due
process of punitive damages.' Justice Stevens noted that, historically,
such objective criteria have been used to compare jurisdictional defii-
tions of first degree murder'm and punishments for nonviolent repeat
offenders.m However, because punitive damages awards are often the
result of intangible factors and can be so different from one another,
the plurality decided that such comparisons would not be practical
when assessing punitive damages. Furthermore, the plurality rea-
soned that, with sufficient procedural safeguards, 6 there is a dimin-
would announce a concrete test with clear standards against which to judge all puni-
tive damages awards. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2720. The plurality was not "persuaded that reliance on petitioner's
'objective' criteria is the proper course to follow." Id.
223. Id. See Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2501-03 (comparing one state's defi-
nition of first degree murder to traditional definitions in determining whether that
definition violated due process).
224. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (deter-
mining whether the penalty for a particular crime is cruel and unusual by comparing
that penalty with other states' penalties for similar crimes), overruled by Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
225. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. The plurality noted that punitive damages awards
involve many factors that may be quite different from case to case. Id. "[A] jury im-
posing a punitive damages award must make a qualitative assessment based on a
host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before it. Because no
two cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to
make." Id. This seems inconsistent with Haslip, where the Court justified their con-
clusion that the award did not violate due process by stating that, "[wihile the mone-
tary comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line, the award here did
not lack objective criteria." See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S 1, 23
(1991).
226. Sufficient procedural safeguards include fair procedures, such as proper jury in-
structions, trial court review, and appellate court review. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. See
also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-23.
ished need for any substantive due process review. 7 Thus, a height-
ened level of scrutiny is simply unnecessary in most cases.'
Ultimately, the plurality followed the Court's holding in Haslip that,
rather than drawing a mathematical bright line, which would be a very
difficult feat, courts should use a general test of reasonableness to as-
sess the substantive due process of punitive damages.
b. Application of reasonableness standard
i. Reasonableness factors
The petitioner argued that the court should have held the punitive
damages award to be "grossly excessive" and violative of substantive
due process because the award was 526 times the actual damages
award.'a The plurality recognized the importance of the numerical
proportionality between the compensatory damages award and the
punitive damages award."2 However, they refused to view this factor
as controlling.' Looking to the West Virginia Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Garnes, relied upon by the state supreme court in TXO, Justice
Stevens held that the reasonableness inquiry also involved other factors,
including "the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's
conduct would have caused to its victim if the wrongful plan had suc-
ceeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have
resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred."233 Justice
Stevens noted that this reasonableness inquiry is consistent with Haslip.'
227. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
228. Id. In fact, according to Justice Scalia, if courts use fair procedures in the
assessment of a punitive damages award, then the award, no matter what its size, is
valid on due process grounds. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Haslip,
499 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
229. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. In fact, the plurality reiterated the Court's statement
in Haslip that "'[a] general concer[n] of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the
constitutional calculus.'" Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18) (alterations in original).
230. Id. at 2721.
231. Id. Justice Stevens acknowledged the Haslip Court's concern that a punitive
damages award four times the compensatory damages was a close call. Id. (citing
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23). He further recognized that the West Virginia Supreme Court,
in Games, relied upon this statement in Haslip in requiring punitive damages to
"bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages." Id. (quoting Games v.
Fleming LandfiU, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va 1991)).
232. Id. The plurality noted that the relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages "was only one of several factors that the State Court mentioned in its
Games opinion." Id.
233. Id. at 2722.
234. Id. at 2721. In Haslip, the Court upheld Alabama's standards for testing the
validity of punitive damages awards, which included the following factor to be con-
sidered: "whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
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ii. Application of factors to the present case
The plurality based its conclusion that the large punitive damages
award assessed against TXO did not violate substantive due process
upon an analysis of the above factors and the record evidence in this
case.' The plurality recognized that the amount of Alliance's potential
royalties was quite large, possibly even several million dollars.' The
plurality reasoned that this large potential harm justified the huge dis-
parity between the actual damages and the punitive damages award. 7
Furthermore, the plurality concluded that the bad faith of the petitioner
and the fact that this conduct was "part of a larger pattern of fraud,
trickery and deceit" justified the $10 million punitive damages
award.' Thus, the petitioner's substantive due process challenge
failed.
2. Procedural Due Process
The petitioner sought a reversal of the punitive damages award based
on the following procedural due process arguments: (1) inadequate jury
instruction, (2) inadequate trial and appellate court review, and (3)
.unconstitutionally vague" procedures.' The plurality did not even
consider the first argument, concerning the adequacy of the jury in-
struction, because this issue was not raised at the state supreme court
level.as
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that actually has occurred." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21. For a complete list of the
factors used by Alabama, see id. at 21-22; supra note 150.
235. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722.
236. Id. The respondents argued that the potential harm was between five and eight
million dollars. Id. Justice Stevens acknowledged the possibility that this number
might be exaggerated. Id. However, he was persuaded that the potential harm was
substantial enough to justify the large punitive damages award on substantive due
process grounds. Id.
237. Id. The plurality was persuaded by the respondent's argument that TXO only
acted as it did because it had a huge profit potential, which also would have trans-
lated into a huge loss potential for Alliance. Id. (citing Appendix to Respondents
Brief at 23a, TXO (No. 92479)).
238. Id. at 2722-23.
239. Id. at 2723.
240. Id. at 2723-24. The plurality explained that the punitive damages jury instruc-
tion departed from the approved Haslip instruction in that it allowed the jury to
consider the wealth of the defendant and to use punitive damages to provide addi-
tional compensation to the plaintiff. Id. at 2723. For the text of the TXO jury instruc-
a. Lower courts' review
i. Trial court
The petitioner argued that the trial court judge's refusal to articulate
his reasons for denying the motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and remittitur constituted a procedural due process viola-
tion."' The plurality disagreed, reasoning that although an explanation
from a trial judge is "helpful," the mere opportunity to be heard on
these motions fulfilled any procedural due process obligations.u2
ii. Appellate court
With respect to the West Virginia Supreme Court, the petitioner ar-
gued that Justice Neely's "really mean" and "really stupid" categories of
defendants were inappropriate and violative of procedural due
process.m The plurality again disagreed, reasoning that these terms
had little to do with the court's opinion, an opinion the plurality be-
lieved was well reasoned with "careful attention" to important case law
from both Haslip and Games." This satisfied the plurality that the
state supreme court's review met procedural due process requirements.
tion, see id. at 2723 n.29. For the text of the Haslip jury instruction, see Haslip, 499
U.S. at 6 n.1. The plurality acknowledged TXO's argument that this instruction in-
creased the risk of prejudice on the part of the jury. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723. The
plurality also admitted to not understanding the reference to "additional compensa-
tion." Id. However, the plurality did note that under Haslip, the "financial position"
of the defendant is an appropriate consideration in the assessment of punitive damag-
es. Id. (citing Hastip, 499 U.S. at 22).
Despite Justice Stevens' discussion of the jury instruction, the plurality refused
to address the issue because TXO failed to raise the issue at the appellate court lev-
el. Id. at 2723.
241. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724.
242. Id. The plurality was "not prepared to characterize the trial judge's failure to
articulate the basis for his denial of the motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for remittitur as a constitutional violation." Id.
243. Id. For a discussion of the state supreme court's reasoning, see supra note
198 and accompanying text.
244. Id. The plurality observed that even the two dissenters in the West Virginia
Supreme Court's decision disagreed only with the majority's terminology and not with
the majority's decision. "The [state supreme court's) opinion was unanimous and gave
careful attention to the relevant precedents, including ... Haslip and . . .Games."
Id.
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b. Vagueness argument
Finally, the petitioner argued that the procedure followed in awarding
the punitive damages was unconstitutionally vague because the petition-
er did not have notice of the possibility that punitive damages would
not be linked to compensatory damages.2" The plurality, however, re-
jected this argument outright, reasoning that the petitioner was put on
notice of this possibility by the Wells v. Smith case, in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court held that punitive damages could be awarded
even in cases where no compensatory damages were awarded. 6
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality's holding that the puni-
tive damages award violated neither substantive nor procedural due
process. 7 Additionally, Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality's
reasoning regarding procedural due process.' However, Justice Ken-
nedy disagreed with the plurality's reasoning regarding substantive due
process, and therefore, he wrote separately to articulate his own rea-
soning."
1. Standard of Review
a. Rejection of reasonableness test
Although Justice Kennedy did not agree with either of the parties'
suggested standards,2 "4 he also disagreed with the plurality's reason-
ableness test."4 Justice Kennedy criticized the reasonableness test as
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1982)). "[T]he notice
component of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a
punitive damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously tortious con-
duct." Id. (citing Hastip, 499 U.S. at 24). It is important to note that in Games, the
West Virginia Supreme Court overturned Wells insofar as it allowed punitive damages
without any compensatory damages. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 908.
247. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
248. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
249. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also wrote separately in Haslip
for quite similar reasons. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text (summarizing the parties' argu-
ments).
251. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 229-34 and
accompanying text (discussing and analyzing the plurality's reasonableness test).
vague and "unhelpful." 2 He believed that the inherent subjectivity and
uncertainty of the reasonableness standard diminished its value as a
workable test.'
b. Justice Kennedy's suggested test
Justice Kennedy preferred to focus on the jury's reasons for awarding
the large award, rather than the reasonableness of the monetary
amount.' He reasoned that instead of contemplating appropriate dol-
lar amounts for punitive damages awards, the Constitution protects
citizens against arbitrary deprivation of property.as Thus, Justice Ken-
nedy believed that the proper inquiry was whether the jury based its
punitive damages award upon the "the rational concern for deterrence
and retribution" rather than on "bias, passion or prejudice," and the size
of the award is just one factor to be considered in this determina-
tion.'
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy believed that since juries may consider
only the evidence presented to them at trial,n' the best way to deter-
mine whether a jury's verdict comports with due process is to deter-
mine whether a reasonable jury could arrive at such a figure based on
the record.' Thus, if the record indicates that a reasonable jury could
252. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy strongly believed that
the reasonableness test was simply inadequate. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
[W]e are still bereft of any standard by which to compare the punishment to
the malefaction that gave rise to it. A reviewing court employing this formu-
lation comes close to relying upon nothing more than its own subjective
reaction to a particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the
award violates the Constitution.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
253. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also supra note 252 and accompanying text.
254. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). "[A] more manageable constitutional inquiry fo-
cuses not on the amount of money a jury awards in a particular case but on the
reasons for doing so." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
255. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The Constitution identifies no particular multiple
of compensatory damages as an acceptable limit for punitive awards; it does not con-
cern itself with dollar amounts, ratios, or the quirks of juries in specific jurisdic-
tions." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy criticized both the plurality and
the dissenters for relying too heavily on the size of the punitive damages award in
their respective conclusions. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
257. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that juries are "bound
to consider only the evidence presented." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). On the other
hand, legislatures may base their judgments on "educated guesses." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
258. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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render a similar punitive damages award, Justice Kennedy would, in the
face of a substantive due process challenge, uphold the award as a
likely product of the legitimate concerns of deterrence and retribu-
tion. 9
2. Application of Justice Kennedy's Analysis
Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality for upholding the award on
the basis of the relationship between the award size and the potential
harm because the record lacked evidence regarding potential harm.'
Thus, Kennedy delved further into the record to search for a legitimate
justification for the jury's large punitive damages award."9 ' He found
one in TXO's malicious conduct.'s Justice Kennedy reasoned that
since TXO committed an intentional tort and there was "ample evidence
of wilful and malicious conduct by TXO," the jury's large punitive dam-
ages award stood up to a substantive due process challenge.'s
C. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred with the
plurality's decision that the punitive damages award violated neither
substantive nor procedural due process.2" Like Justice Kennedy, Jus-
259. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
260. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that "the record in this
case does not contain evidence, argument, or instructions regarding the potential
harm from TXO's conduct and so would not have permitted a reasonable jury to
render its verdict on this basis." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In her dissenting opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor asserted the same criticism of the plurality. Id. at 2734-36
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 309-16 and accompanying text.
261. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that "[tlhis was not a
case of negligence, strict liability, or respondeat superior. TXO was found to have
committed . . . the intentional tort of slander of title." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Kennedy admitted to "feeling a certain degree of disquiet in affirming [the] award,"
but he did so because he believed that, given the record, the jury based its determi-
nation on legitimate concerns. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). It is interesting to note that in Haslip, Jus-
tice Marshall joined in the majority, while his replacement, Justice Thomas, did not
join in the TXO plurality. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 3
(1991); TXO, 113 S. CL at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a detailed discussion of
how changes in the court since Haslip have impacted the punitive damages issue,
see supra notes 347-50.
tice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's reasoning regarding substantive
due process. However, unlike Kennedy, Justice Scalia believed that the
size of a punitive damages award fails to raise a substantive due pro-
cess issue.2" Additionally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's
reasoning regarding procedural due process, concluding that the
plurality's analysis in depth was unnecessary.'
1. Substantive Due Process
Justice Scalia recognized the principle of substantive due process and
its protection of rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 7 However, he
explained that such branch of due process stops there and does not
encompass other rights, such as economic rights.'M Thus, Scalia found
it "particularly difficult to imagine that 'due process' contain[ed] the
substantive right not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages. " o
Scalia reasoned that if this were true, the same would follow for exces-
sive fines, and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
would never have been necessary."o
265. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote a separate
opinion in Haslip for similar reasons. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
266. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIV.
268. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727. Justice Scalia has a reputation for limiting the sub-
stantive branch of due process to rights expressly provided for in the Constitution.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens,
and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL L. Rsv. 583, 605 (1991) (calling
Justice Scalia a "rigid textualist" in his approach to statutory construction); Blanche
Duett, First Amendment Freedom of Association: Destruction by the Supreme Court's
New Stare Decisis Doctrine?, 33 S. TEx. L.J. 617, 637 (1992) (describing Justice
Scalia as a "strict constructionist"). Other Justices have held that there are implied
rights, such as the right to family, marriage, and procreation, which are also protect-
ed by substantive due process. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502-04 (1977) (holding that a person's decision regarding family is a fundamental
right under substantive due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (holding that the fundamental right of privacy affords substantive due process
protection to a person choosing to use contraceptives). However, most Justices de-
cline to extend substantive due process protection to mere economic regulations. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938) (holding that mere econom-
ic regulations have no substantive due process rights as long as the regulation is
rationally related to the health, safety, and welfare of the state); LOcKHART ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 449 (6th ed. 1985) (noting that the
Court has not struck down an economic regulation on substantive due process
grounds since 1937).
269. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia further explained that while "'procedural due process
requires judicial review of punitive damages awards for reasonable-
ness," this does not include a substantive due process right to a "rea-
sonable" award.27' He reasoned that the same is true for compensatory
damages awards.272
2. Procedural Due Process
Justice Scalia believed that punitive damages awards comport with
procedural due process requirements when the trial court explains the
purpose of punitive damages to the jury and the award is reviewed for
reasonableness.272 Since the award against TXO involved both of these
procedural protections, Justice Scalia concluded that it did not violate
procedural due process.7 4
Justice Scalia, despite his disagreement with the plurality's reasoning,
believes that the decision constituted a necessary step toward creating
standards for due process review of punitive damages.21 Scalia ex-
271. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concluded, "with punitive damages:
judicial assessment of their reasonableness is a federal right, but a correct assess-
ment of their reasonableness is not." Id. (Scalia. J., concurring). See also infra note
273 and accompanying text.
272. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia observed that "no one would claim
(or at least no one has yet claimed) that a substantively correct determination of suf-
ficiency of evidence and reasonableness of compensatory damages is a federal consti-
tutional right." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). Note that this "reasonableness" is not the
same as the substantive "reasonableness" contemplated by the plurality. Id. at 2727
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia believes that so long as the means are "reason-
able" and employ the required Haslip safeguards, such as proper jury instructions
and post-trial review, the ends, namely the size of the award, need not meet any sub-
stantive reasonableness standard. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
25-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
275. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). "Today's reprise of Haslip ... has not been a
waste." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Many commentators disagree. See, e.g., Joan
Biskupic, Court Backs $10 Million Jury Verdict: Punitive Damages Decision Reflects
Split on Awards, WASH. POST, June 26, 1993, at C1 (noting that "while individual
justices may be troubled by such huge awards, they cannot agree on what to do
with them"); Howard Fields, Supreme Court Again Fails to Cap Big Jury Awards,
PUB. WKLY., July 12, 1993, at 16 ("The . . .Court ended its term . . .deciding once
again that it could not find a formula for putting a cap on punitive damages); Thom-
as R. Newman & Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Review of Punitive Damages, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
1, 1993, at 3 (noting that, despite Justice Scalia's optimism, "lower courts will contin-
ue to struggle with the constitutional limits of punitive damages").
plained that the plurality more closely followed traditional procedural
requirements by allowing larger punitive damages awards than in
Haslip." Justice Scalia would have gone "one step further" than the
plurality by "shut[ting] the door [that] the Court [left] slightly ajar" by
dismissing the idea of substantive due process rights regarding the size
of punitive damages awards, but he was pleased to find out just how
far the plurality's "constitutional sensibilities" would bend without being
"jarred."2
77
D. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Souter,278 disagreed
with the majority's affirmance of the punitive damages award.279
O'Connor would have struck down the award on both substantive and
procedural due process grounds.'s Justice O'Connor expressed her
remorse that the Court's holding rendered false the Haslip Court's
"promise", that "punitive damages awards would receive sufficient con-
stitutional scrutiny to restore fairness in what is rapidly becoming an
arbitrary and oppressive system."" Justice O'Connor expressed her
concern about "skyrocketing" punitive damages awards, not accompa-
nied by "a corresponding expansion of procedural protections." 2
Justice O'Connor began her opinion with a rather lengthy discussion
of the history and ideas behind the American jury system.' O'Connor
276. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring). For example, while the Haslip
Court called a punitive damages award four times the compensatory damages award
"close to the line," Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24, the TXO plurality affirmed a punitive dam-
ages award of over 500 times the compensatory damages award with no reference to
"the line" at all. XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718-20. Furthermore, the plurality in this case
was much more lenient on the procedural requirements than the Haslip Court. Id. at
2720-22; Hastip, 499 U.S. at 16.
277. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727-28 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia thinks that by
recognizing a punitive damages substantive due process right, the plurality is "spawn-
ing wasteful litigation." Id. at 2728 (Scalia, J., concurring). "The Constitution gives
federal courts no business in this area, except to assure that due process (i.e. tradi-
tional procedure) has been observed." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter only joined in the opinion
as to parts II-B-2, II-C, III, and IV. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It is interesting to
note that in Haslip, Justice Souter had no part in the decision, and Justice White
joined with the majority. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 2, 24.
279. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor would have reversed the award
because she found it inconsistent with Haslip. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2728, 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's loyalty to Haslip
and its promise are remarkable considering that she was the sole dissenter in that
case. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 2728-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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acknowledged that the jury system is founded on principles of fairness
and usually works very well, especially in conjunction with procedural
protections such as the rules of evidence, jury instructions, and appel-
late review.' However, she also recognized that jurors are not infalli-
ble and sometimes the system falters, allowing the negative influences
of bias, passion, and prejudice to enter into the fact finding process and
invalidate the verdict on procedural due process grounds.'
Justice O'Connor noted that while the risk of such influences affect-
ing the verdict is present in all cases to some extent, the risk is espe-
cially substantial in the area of punitive damages, where jurors are
often given only cursory guidance.' O'Connor reasoned that vague
instructions increase this risk because when people are "'[d]eprived of
any fixed landmarks and guideposts... [they] can be distracted ... to
the point where [their] best guess is far from reliable.'"287 Justice
O'Connor recognized that it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain the precise bases of the jury's verdict; however, she main-
tained that such influences must be discovered by inference if neces-
sary.' Furthermore, O'Connor noted that, traditionally, disproportion-
ate and/or excessive jury verdicts have commanded such an inference,
resulting in a retrial.'
284. Id. at 2728-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor made reference to
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which set the foundation
for the jury system. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amends.
VI, VII. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor observed that "the jury system long has been
a guarantor of fairness, a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of civic values."
7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
285. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 2729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
175 (1991)). Based on the language in her opinion, it does not appear that Justice
O'Connor was belittling jurors or insulting the intelligence of lay people. For example,
Justice O'Connor expressed her belief that "'[like everyone else in the court system,
juries need and deserve objective rules for decision,'" and that "'any of us can be dis-
tracted . . . to the point where our best guess is far from reliable'" if we are "'de-
prived of any fixed landmarks and guideposts.'" Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added) (quoting WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 175 (1991)). Howev-
er, Justice O'Connor did recognize that jurors may be more susceptible to such "dis-
tractions" because "'the layman jury cannot be so quickly domesticated to official role
and tradition.'" Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 497-98 (1966)).
288. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 2729-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice O'Connor point-
ed out several English common law cases in which the court remanded the case for
Justice O'Connor also believed that since punitive damages are a
form of punishment, the principle of proportionality between the pun-
ishment and the offense becomes relevant.' ° She pointed to several
cases throughout history that have applied this principle to punitive
damages, requiring that punitive damages awards "bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual harm imposed.""'
1. Substantive Due Process
a. Standard of review
Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality's reasonableness standard for
appearing to be a test, when in reality it provided no guidance to other
courts at all.' O'Connor agreed with the plurality that it was im-
practical, if not impossible, to draw a "mathematical bright line between
the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able." However, she did not see this as a valid excuse for failing to
set forth clear standards.' Furthermore, Justice O'Connor believed
retrial because, based upon the large size of the damages award, the court inferred
that the jury was probably influenced by improper motives. See id. at 2730 n.1
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Hewlett v. Cruchley, 128 Eng. Rep. 696, 698
(C.P. 1813) (holding that clearly excessive verdicts will be sent to another jury for
retrial); Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 96 Eng. Rep. 549 (K.B. 1774) (holding that large awards
may be "so monstrous and excessive, as to be . . . evidence of [jury] . . . passion or
partiality")). In another footnote, O'Connor presented a list of early and modem
American cases that reached similar results. See id. at 2730 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (citing, e.g., Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403, 406 (1855) (mandating reversal
of a verdict where its size "shocks our sense of justice"); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 94 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "the extreme
amount of an award . . . can be some evidence of bias or prejudice in an appropri-
ate case").
290. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 284-85 (1983) (explaining that the proportionality requirement is deeply rooted in
history), overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
291. Id. at 2731 & n.3 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The cases that Justice O'Connor
used to support this contention are the very same cases used by the plurality to
support their finding that punitive damages have substantive due process limitations.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Southwestern Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (holding that awards that are "plainly arbi-
trary and oppressive" violate due process); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S.
86, 111 (1909) (holding that "grossly excessive" awards violate due process).
292. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor observed
that the plurality "reject[ed] both petitioner's and respondents' proffered approaches,
[and] instead selected] a seemingly moderate course .... But the course the plu-
rality chooses is, in fact, no course at all." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
294. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice O'Connor believed that the lack
of a "mathematical bright line" actually created a greater obligation to provide guide-
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that these standards should be objective, so as to avoid purely subjec-
tive decisions based on personal preferences. 5
O'Connor suggested some possible standards that she found to be
especially probative in this case.' First, O'Connor believed that care-
ful judicial review is very important where, as here, the relationship be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages is disproportionate. 7 This
526-fold discrepancy should at least "raise a suspicious judicial eye-
brow," especially in light of the Court's statement in Haslip that a puni-
tive damages award four times the actual damages was "close to the
line. " ' Secondly, Justice O'Connor saw the need for a comparison of
this punitive damages award to others upheld against other defendants
in West Virginia,' and she noted that this award was twenty times
greater than the largest punitive damages award ever handed down in
West Virginia.'m Third, Justice O'Connor called for a comparison of
this punitive damages award to others upheld for similar torts in all
jurisdictions."° O'Connor's research revealed that this punitive damag-
posts for other courts because without such a line, even more is left to the imagina-
tion. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While Justice O'Connor recognized that imposing a
multi-part test on the states violated important principles of federalism that encourage
the states to experiment with different approaches, she felt strongly that the lower
courts deserve some guidance, even if it was less than such a test. Id. at 2733
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
Furthermore, O'Connor "[did] not see what [could] be gained by blinding ourselves to
the few clear guideposts in an area so painfully bereft of objective criteria." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor observed that "[w]ithout
objective criteria ... almost any decision regarding proportionality will be a matter
of personal preference. One judge's excess very well may be another's moderation."
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As TXO's series of splintered opinions illustrates, this
observation may very well be true for Supreme Court Justices as well.
296. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24). Justice
O'Connor found the $10 million punitive damages award in this case to be "shock-
ing." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, O'Connor maintained that "if the qua-
druple damages .. . award in Haslip was 'close to the line,' absent a convincing ex-
planation, this . . . award-over 500 times actual damages-surely must cross it." Id.
at 2732-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Petitioners Brief at la-3a, TXO
(No. 92-479) (Appendix)). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor was surprised that the larg-
est punitive damages award ever upheld in West Virginia was not in a grave personal
injury case, but rather in a business dispute case. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
es award was ten times larger than the largest award for slander of title
in any jurisdiction.' Finally, Justice O'Connor prescribed a compari-
son between the punitive damages award and legislative penalties for
similar conduct,' and she discovered that this award was several
times larger than both civil and criminal penalties for similar offens-
es.
sM
Although Justice O'Connor warned about the limitations of this "ob-
jective criteria" approach since all cases are different, O'Connor be-
lieved that objective criteria are essential to substantive due process
determinations regarding punitive damages..5 and that the Court
should have employed this particular set of criteria. Pointing to
these objective criteria and their application to the punitive damages
award assessed against TXO, Justice O'Connor would have concluded
that this award was "'grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
offense' and bears no 'understandable relationship to compensatory
damages.'" 7
b. Criticism of the plurality's potential harm approach
Justice O'Connor recognized that basing punitive damages awards on
potential harm has its merits in serving the state's interests in deter-
rence and retribution." However, O'Connor believed that because
there was very little evidence on the record regarding potential harmm
and the jury instruction regarding punitive damages made no mention
of potential harm,"' the jury could not have relied on such evidence
302. Id. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Petitioners Brief at 5a-Sa, TXO
(No. 92-479) (Appendix)).
303. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Petitioners Brief at 19 nn. 17-18,
TXO (No. 92-479) (Appendix)).
305. See supra notes 292-304 and accompanying text.
306. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
307. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18, 22).
308. Id. at 2734 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, courts traditionally linked
punitive damages to potential harm. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Benson v.
Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (KB. 1766)).
309. Id. at 2734-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor discussed the record
evidence in detail. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor observed that no one, not
a single expert or lay witness, testified or presented the jury with evidence regarding
potential harm. Id. at 2734 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Also, none of the respondents'
attorneys argued at trial that punitive damages should be linked with potential harm.
Id. at 2736 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, she observed that the respondents
did not present their multi-million dollar estimate of potential harm until they were
before the United States Supreme Court. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 2735 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The jury was instructed to consider "'the
nature of the wrongdoing, the extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the party
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and, thus, the plurality should not have relied on it as a justification for
that same jury's verdict.3"
Justice O'Connor suspected that, given the vast amount of record
evidence regarding TXO's wealth and out-of-state status" and the fact
that the punitive damages jury instruction permitted consideration of
such evidence,"' the jury likely relied upon this, rather than potential
harm, in assessing punitive damages.' Justice O'Connor noted that
jurors have traditionally disfavored large corporations and, thus, have
been willing to award large sums of money against them."'6 She also
committing the act, the wealth of the perpetrator, as well as any mitigating circum-
stances,'" but not the potential harm resulting from the perpetrator's conduct had it
been successful. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2723 n.29 (plurality opin-
ion)). O'Connor recognized that the jury may have relied upon potential harm even
though it was not instructed to do so, but she maintained that this possibility was
mere speculation and should not be relied upon in this case. Id. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
311. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor characterized the respondents'
potential harm argument as a mere "after-the-fact rationalization." Id. at 2736
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 2736-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Once again, Justice O'Connor took a
long walk through the trial record, this time pointing out an enormous amount of
evidence concerning the wealth and out of state status of TXO. Id. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). O'Connor observed that the respondents' estimate of TXO's total resources,
which amounted to two billion dollars, was repeatedly presented to the jury, as well
as the fact that TXO was not from West Virginia, but rather from Texas. Id. at 2738
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, she noted that the respondents' attorneys
repeatedly reminded the jury of these two points during closing arguments. Id. at
2738-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 2736-37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that the jury
instruction allowed the jury to consider the defendant's wealth and to award punitive
damages as "additional compensation" if necessary. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
O'Connor expressed concern that this instruction invited the jury to assess a large
punitive damages award. It is important to note that, unlike the jury instruction in
this case, the instruction that the Court approved in Haslip did not contain the two
factors mentioned above. However, the Hastip Court did rule that the defendant's
"financial position" could be considered by the jury in assessing punitive damages.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).
314. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2736-37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Once again, there is a
possibility that the jury did not obey the instruction. However, as Justice O'Connor
mentioned in her discussion of potential harm, this possibility is highly speculative
and, thus, immaterial. See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
315. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2737-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted
that "[c]ourts long have recognized that jurors may view large corporations with dis-
favor." Id. at 2737 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v.
Welch, 52 111. 183, 188 (1869)).
noted that the three largest punitive damages awards ever upheld in
West Virginia were against out-of-state defendants."6
Justice O'Connor recognized that jury consideration of the
defendant's wealth when determining punitive damages awards has its
merits, but she warned that when the jury is flooded with evidence of
such wealth, a grave danger of jury bias and undue influence arises."'
Because Justice O'Connor believed that this jury's determination of
punitive damages was unduly influenced by the' defendant's great
wealth, she concluded that the award should not be upheld."8
2. Procedural Due Process
Justice O'Connor also concluded that the punitive damages award
violated procedural due process because the review by both the trial
court and the West Virginia Supreme Court was inadequate in providing
the "meaningful constraint" on jury discretion required by Haslip.3 9
The Court in Haslip upheld the award in that case partially because the
trial court was required to go on record as to its reasons for interfering
or not interfering with a jury verdict. ° Justice O'Connor distinguished
this case because the trial court was not required to and did not make
any such findings.32" '
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor believed that the state supreme
court's review was too "cursory" to pass constitutional muster.' The
supreme court first refused to consider a remittitur motion because the
petitioners "failed to conduct themselves as gentlemen" 3 and then re-
fused to strike the punitive damages award as excessive simply because
the petitioner was "really mean. " 4 Justice O'Connor maintained that
316. Id. at 2738. These three punitive damages cases are: TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va
1992) at 870 (affirming a $10 million punitive damages award); Jarvis v. Modem
Woodmen of Am., 406 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1991) (affirming a $500,000 punitive damag-
es award); Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 381 S.E.2d 367, 377 (W. Va. 1989)
(affirming a $500,000 punitive damages award).
317. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2737-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Haslip majority
called for jury consideration of the defendant's wealth. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21. But
see Morris, supra note 49, at 1191 ("[Rlich men do not fare well before juries, and
the more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare. Such evidence may
do more harm than good; jurymen may be more interested in divesting vested inter-
est than in attempting to fix (appropriate] penalties.").
318. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2739 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 2740 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20).
321. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 274041 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 2741 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at
887-89).
324. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 889).
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while the state supreme court articulated the proper rule of law, the
court had not adequately applied the rule and, thus, their review violat-
ed procedural due process.'s
V. IMPACT OF TXO V. ALLIANCE
The TXO decision did more than simply reiterate the soft due process
standards regarding punitive damages that the Court first articulated in
Haslip. 8 TXO is significant for several reasons. First, it is only the
second due process punitive damages case to be decided by the United
States Supreme Court." Second, instead of clarifying the standards
set forth in Haslip, the TXO Court actually created more confusion.'
Justice O'Connor called the state supreme court's "really mean" terminology "a carica-
ture of the difficult task of determining whether an award may be upheld consistent
with due process." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, O'Connor maintained
that malicious conduct alone was simply not enough to support the due process
validity of such a large punitive damages award. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor was surprised by the West Virginia Supreme Court's cursory review of
TXO's punitive damages in light of that court's thorough review in Games. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Games v Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909-
10).
325. Id. at 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "We ... rely primarily on state courts to
fulfill the constitutional role as primary guarantors of federal rights. But, the state
courts must do more than recite the constitutional rule. They also must apply it." Id.
at 2741-42.
326. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991). See TXO, 113 S.
Ct. at 2720. See also Newman & Ahmuty, supra note 275, at 3.
327. Haslip was the first Supreme Court case to consider the due process of puni-
tive damages. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1. See also supra notes 138-53 (discussing Haslip
in detail). Because TXO was only the Supreme Court's second reply to a due process
challenge to punitive damages and because this reply was only two years after the
only other opinion regarding this issue, many commentators expected the Supreme
Court to clarify the law in this area by setting forth a multi-part test or specific stan-
dards. See infra note 373 (discussing expectations in anticipation of the Court's deci-
sion in TXO).
328. Haslip and 7XO adopted similar "reasonableness" standards. Haslip, 499 U.S.
at 18; TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719-20. However, in Haslip, the Court almost unanimously
upheld this standard, while in TXO, not even a majority could agree on this standard.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 2 (the majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and White); TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2714 (the plurality opin-
ion was joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and Stevens).
The uncertainty created by TXO as to the due process standards for punitive
damages may generate even more inconsistent lower court opinions than there were
after Haslip. For a discussion of such inconsistencies in light of Haslip, see supra
Finally, TXO referred to the vague "line of constitutional impropriety"
for punitive damages that was set forth in Haslip without ever ex-
pounding upon where that line lies.' The following analysis will ex-
amine these and other probable implications and impacts of TXO.
A. Judicial Impact
1. Impact on the Haslip Holding
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,sa decided only two
years before the TXO case, was the Court's first pronouncement on the
due process implications of punitive damages." In Haslip, the Court
held that there are due process limitations on punitive damages and
implied that a punitive damages award four times the actual damages
award was "close to the line of constitutional impropriety. " ' Formal-
ly, Haslip left "the line" undefined; however, the Court's "four-to-one"
statement provided a small hint as to how the Court might define that
line in the future.'
Unfortunately, the Court's decision in TXO did not define "the line"
referred to in Haslip. In fact, the Court retreated from the guidance it
provided in Haslip.' In TXO, the Court upheld a punitive damages
award 526 times the actual damages award.' Now the definition of
"the line" is even more obscure and tentative than before.'
notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
329. Supreme Court Proceedings, supra note 5. "The problem in the wake of the
[Clourt's splintered decision [in TXO] is not whether there are substantive due pro-
cess limits on punitive damages, but how to determine what they are." Id. In Haslip,
the Court did indicate that a "four-to-one" ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages was "close to the line." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. However, the TXO Court
neither followed this "standard," nor set forth a substitute. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719.
330. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
331. For further discussion of the evolution of the Court's willingness to review due
process issues regarding punitive damages, see supra notes 117-53 and accompanying
text.
332. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. See also supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the Haslip holding more specifically).
333. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. This statement was followed by some courts in the two
years between Haslip and TXO. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases that followed and ignored this four-to-one "rule").
334. The Court accomplished this by upholding a punitive damages award that
greatly exceeded the four-to-one ratio that the Haslip Court warned might be "close
to the line." TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724.
335. Id.
336. In Haslip, although "the line" was not specifically defined, the Court did give
lower courts some guidance by suggesting that a "four-to-one" punitive damages and
compensatory damages ratio was "close to the line." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. Many
people expected TXO to be at least another step toward defining "the line" or
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Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Souter, warned
against such a result in her dissenting opinion. 7 Although Justice
O'Connor would not have provided a word-for-word definition of "the
line," she would have provided some clear standards to help other
courts review the constitutionality of punitive damages in the future.'
However, six Justices did not agree. Rather, they felt that due process
determinations regarding punitive damages are very fact-specific, mak-
ing clear, objective standards inappropriate.'
The TXO decision stands for the proposition that punitive damages
awards of any size might be upheld if the defendant's conduct is, in the
words of Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court, "really
mean.""0 The result is that when the dust settles, other courts are left
establishing specific standards that could be used to determine "the line" in particular
cases. Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4. However, in TXO, the Court seemed to back
away from its four-to-one statement in Haslip and did everything but provide guid-
ance for lower courts who will need to define "the line" in the future. See TXO, 113
S. Ct. at 2718-24.
By not defining a "mathematical bright line," the Court seemed to imply that al-
though award size is a factor in the substantive due process analysis, it is not deter-
minative. Id. at 2719. Rather, the award size must be commensurate with what the
Court termed "potential harm." See id. at 2718; supra notes 233, 236-37 and accom-
panying text. Thus, it seems that even a punitive damages award over one thousand
times the compensatory damages award could conceivably be upheld if such award
was commensurate with the "potential harm" caused by the defendant's intentionally
wrongful conduct. This is consistent with the West Virginia Supreme Court's reason-
ing. See TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1992) at 887-88; supra note 198 and accompanying
text; iqnra note 340 and accompanying text.
337. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2733. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor stated, "I do not
see what can be gained by blinding ourselves to the few clear guideposts in an area
so painfully bereft of objective criteria." Id.
338. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 2719; id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2726 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). It should be noted that Justices Scalia and Thomas refrained from set-
ting standards because they do not think punitive damages are a substantive due
process issue. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
340. TXO, 419 S.E.2d (W. Va 1992) at 889. Justice Neely explained:
By really mean defendants, we signify those defendants who intentionally
commit acts they know to be harmful ....
In really mean cases, the cynosure in determining the reasonableness of
the jury's verdict . . . is the amount of punitive damages required to cause
the defendant to mend its evil ways and to discourage others similarly situat-
ed from engaging in like reprehensible conduct.
Accordingly, we find that in cases where the defendant [was really
with even less of an indication regarding "the line" than they had be-
fore."
2. From Haslip Majority to TXO Plurality
The punitive damages awards in both Haslip and TXO were upheld
by a Court majority." However, unlike in Haslip, the TXO majority
was fractured into several opinions because the Justices could not
agree on a single rationale for upholding the award.' This seems to
be largely a function of the changing Court.
In Haslip, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, and
Stevens; Justices Scalia and Kennedy each wrote separate concurring
opinions; and Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion.' In TXO,
mean], even punitive damages 500 times greater than compensatory damages
are not per se unconstitutional ....
Id.
341. A brief look at cases decided since the Supreme Court's TXO decision illus-
trates the obscurity of "the line." See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1380 (relying
on Haslip, rather than TXO, because the latter was only joined by a plurality of the
Court, but noting Justice Scalia's statement that "the procedures approved in
TXO . . .[were] 'far less detailed and restrictive than those upheld in Haslip'") (quot-
ing TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Scalia, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1993); Troutt v. Charcoal Steak House, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 899, 901 (W.D. Va. 1993)
(noting that, "'Under well settled law, [the existence and frequency of similar past
conduct is] typically considered in assessing punitive damages) (quoting TXO, 113 S.
Ct. at 2722 n.28) (alteration in original); Brennan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
No. 92-00064A, 1993 WL 470426, at *8 (D. Guam Oct. 19, 1993) (upholding a large
punitive damages award, reasoning that, under TWO, punitive damages awards are af-
forded a strong presumption of validity so long as fair procedures were followed);
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1460 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding
that plaintiff class satisfied jurisdictional minimum with its large punitive damages
claim, reasoning that, in light of TXO, there is no mathematical limit to punitive dam-
ages).
342. In Haslip, the award was upheld by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Blackmun, Kennedy, Marshall, Scalia, Stevens, and White. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4; id. at
40 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). In TAO, the award was
upheld by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Scalia, Stevens,
and Thomas. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2714; id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
343. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text. Although the majority encom-
passed three separate opinions in both Haslip and TXO, only Haslip had an actual
majority opinion. See infra notes 34445 and accompanying text. In TXO, the greatest
number of justices concurring together in a single opinion was three. See supra notes
200-06 and accompanying text.
344. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4; id. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 24 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not take part in
the decision of this case. Id. at 24.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Stevens all reached virtually the same conclusion that they
reached respectively in Haslip and employed almost precisely the same
rationale for their conclusions. 5 However, Justice White made a dras-
tic change from his decision in Haslip, shifting from the majority to the
dissent.u This shift had the important effect of reducing the fragile
five Justice majority to a mere plurality.
Additionally, there were several major changes in the Court between
Haslip and TXO that impacted the Court's alignment. TXO was decided
after Justice Marshall retired.' 7 Justice Thomas, Marshall's replace-
ment, did not join in the plurality opinion as Marshall probably would
have,' but rather joined in Justice Scalia's separate opinion concur-
345. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and Stevens all upheld both the
Haslip and TXO awards based on a generalized reasonableness test, joining in the
Court's main opinion in both cases. Hastip, 499 U.S. at 18-19; TXO, 113 S. Ct. at
2720. In both cases, Justice Kennedy wrote separate concurring opinions, agreeing
with the conclusion of the main opinion, but disagreeing with the reasoning. Haslip,
499 U.S. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring); TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). In both cases, Justice Scalia wrote separate opinions, concluding that puni-
tive damages are not protected under substantive due process. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24
(Scalia, J., concurring); TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring). Finally, Jus-
tice O'Connor dissented in both cases, arguing that the awards violated due process
and should be reversed. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); TXO, 113 S.
Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
346. In Haslip, Justice White joined with the majority, arguing that the punitive
damages award did not violate due process. Hastip, 499 U.S. at 4. However, in TXO,
Justice White disagreed with the plurality's affirmance of the punitive damages award
because he believed that this award violated due process. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In light of this shift, it would have been interesting to read
an opinion written by Justice White in the TXO case, especially given that "he was
very attentive to the need to give guidance to lower courts," according to David 0.
Stewart, a former law clerk to Justice White. Marcia Coyle, The High Court's Center
Falls Apart, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at SI.
347. Justice Marshall retired just after the Court's 1991-92 term. Randall Kennedy,
Doing What You Can With What You Have: The Greatness of Justice Marshall, 80
GEO. LJ. 2081 (1992); Helen Dewar, Two More Democrats Voice Support for Thomas:
Senate to Vote Tuesday on High Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1991, at A8.
Justice Marshall joined in the majority opinion in Hastip. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4.
348. This prediction is based on the fact that Justice Marshall joined in the majority
opinion in Haslip, and the fact that Justice Marshall joined with Justice Blackmun in
other major punitive damages cases. See Hastip, 499 U.S. at 4 (Justice Blackmun
wrote the majority opinion in which Justice Marshall concurred); Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 257 (1989) (Justice Blackmun authored
the majority opinion in which Justice Marshall concurred); Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 71 (Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion, and
ring in the judgment.u9 Thus, Marshall's retirement, notwithstanding
Justice White's change of heart, dismantled the Haslip majority and,
simultaneously, increased Court support by 100 percent for Justice
Scalia's conclusion that punitive damages do not have substantive due
process implications. Furthermore, Justice Souter, who did not partici-
pate in the Haslip decision, joined in Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion.'
Therefore, it is evident that the alignment of the Court on due pro-
cess issues regarding punitive damages is changing rapidly. In just two
short years, the Court majority on the due process implications of puni-
tive damages has splintered into several factions. Currently, not more
that three of the nine United States Supreme Court Justices can agree
upon why they are upholding large punitive damages awards in the face
of due process challenges." All that is agreed upon is that this partic-
ular award should be upheld.' Perhaps in the future the Court will
not even be able to agree on that. This is significant because it may
indicate a step toward the Court's reversal of such awards in the fu-
ture.
.
Justice Ginsburg, President Clinton's most recent addition to the
United States Supreme Court, may add an interesting twist to the align-
ment of the Court on the punitive damages issue. Justice Ginsburg is
reputed to be a moderate centrist.' This makes it very difficult to
predict her opinion on the due process punitive damages issue. It seems
unlikely that Ginsburg will follow in the footsteps of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, finding that punitive damages do not have substantive due
process limits.' However, because punitive damages do not fall neatly
into traditional political coalitions,' Justice Ginsburg could decide
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion).
349. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
350. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4 (noting that Justice Souter took no part in consider-
ation of the Court's decision); TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
351. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text (describing the alignment of the
Justices in the TXO case).
352. Six Justices agreed to uphold the award. See supra notes 3, 200-06 and accom-
panying text.
353. This prediction is based on the fact that two years ago the Court fashioned a
majority opinion to uphold a large punitive damages award, but now that majority
has been dismantled. See also supra notes 342-50 and accompanying text.
354. Rice, supra note 20, at 14. However, many legal commentators believe that
Ginsburg is "not naturally aligned with the moderate conservatives of the court and
is likely to be more left of the center." Id.
355. Justices Scalia and Thomas' conclusion that punitive damages have no substan-
tive due process rights is a very strict construction of the Constitution, a construc-
tion that is inconsistent with Ginsburg's "activist record." Id.
356. Interview with Gregory Ogden, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University
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either way on the punitive damages due process issue, upholding them
or striking them down. 7 It is also possible that she may be willing to
uphold some large awards, but not others.m
Some commentators think that TXO was the Court's last word on the
due process implications of punitive damages."s These commentators
believe that the TXO decision was the Court's way of charging the polit-
ical process and legislatures with the task of deciding what to do about
punitive damages.'m It is to these two areas that we now turn.
School of Law, in Malibu, CA (Nov. 15, 1993). See also infra notes 361-97 and ac-
companying text (discussing the current political nature of punitive damages).
357. Interview with Gregory Ogden, supra note 356. However, in his speech an-
nouncing his nomination of Ginsburg, President Clinton stated that Justice Ginsburg
stood for "the person less well off, the outsider in society . . . not simply the power-
ful." Dwight L Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and
the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostik v. Florida, 67 TUL. L REV. 1979, 2049-
50 n.257 (1993). If this statement is true, perhaps Justice Ginsburg will be against
punitive damages limitations because of her desire to protect the less powerful.
358. According to Jesse Choper, Professor of Law at the University of California at
Berkeley, it is unlikely that Justice Ginsburg will "break the grip of the conservative
majority or become the swing vote" on most major issues. Constitutional Law Con-
ference, 62 U.S.LW. 2263 (1993). However, punitive damages was not one of the ma-
jor issues mentioned by Professor Choper. Id. In trying to predict Justice Ginsburg's
views on the punitive damages issue, Choper's comment must be applied with cau-
tion, keeping in mind that the punitive damages issue is one that does not fall into
traditional political philosophies. Interview with Gregory Ogden, supra note 356.
For general information about Justice Ginsburg and her decisions as an appellate
judge on the D.C. Circuit, see generally J. Stratton Shartel, Ginsburg's Opinions Re-
veal Willingness to Grant Access to Litigants, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus., Aug. 1993,
at 1; Other Decisions of Interest by Justice Ginsburg, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus., Aug.
1993, at 24.
359. Frey & Tanger, supra note 4, at 20. However, Frey and Tanger disagree with
these commentators. Id. They believe that in cases with different facts, where the
plaintiffs conduct is less egregious and where the potential harm is not large, similar
punitive damages awards might very well be overturned by a majority of the Court.
Id. See also David S. Savage, Supreme Court Refuses to Curb Punitive Awards, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 1993, at A12, A14 (stating that "[in TXO], the [JIustices . . . made
clear that they will take a hands-off approach to punitive awards"). But see Victor E.
Schwartz, Supreme Court Opens Challenges to Excessive and Arbitrary Punitive
Awards, PRENTICE HALL L & Bus., Aug. 1993, at 13 (arguing that the Court has left
several doors open for due process challenges to punitive damages).
360. Interview with Gregory Ogden, supra note 356 (stating that in light of the
Court's opinion in TXO, the tort reformers will most likely shift their focus from the
U.S. Supreme Court to state legislatures). Justice Scalia, in his concurring, opinion,
stated that "state legislatures and courts have ample authority to eliminate any per-
ceived 'unfairness' in the common-law punitive damage regime, and have frequently
B. Political and Legislative Impact
1. The Conservative Court
Twelve straight years of Republican Presidents have left the Supreme
Court quite conservative."l Together, Reagan and Bush appointed five
of the nine current Supreme Court Justices, a majority of the Court.'
As a result, this Court is likely to favor big business just as the Reagan
and Bush administrations did.' One would expect that this would
lead the conservative Court majority to overturn large punitive damages
awards against large corporations such as TXO. Furthermore, one
would expect the Court to set forth clear standards that limit punitive
damages in order to protect similar corporations.
However, contrary to this popular belief, the conservative nature of
the Court has seemingly backfired on the ex-Presidents who compiled
it. It seems that the more conservative a Justice is, the less likely he or
she will be to overturn lower court decisions.' For example, Justices
exercised that authority in recent years." TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). One commentator interpreted Justice Scalia's statement to mean that "advocates
of punitive damage reform will have to redouble their lobbying efforts to achieve
meaningful standards in state legislatures around the country." Taking it to the
States, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug. 2, 1993, at 32. See also Max Boot, Supreme Court's
1992-93 Legacy: A Zigzag Course, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1993, at 1 (noting
that "the lower court deliberately may be issuing narrow decisions in the expectation
that lower courts and legislatures will fill in the gaps").
361. Coyle, supra note 346, at SI. "Even as President Clinton begins to put his
imprint on the U.S. Supreme Court, the term just ended showed that the [Clourt is
still very much the house that Reagan and Bush built" Id.
362. President Reagan appointed Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Richard C.
Reuben, Man In The Middle, CAL. L, Oct. 1992, at 35. President Bush appointed Jus-
tices Souter and Thomas. William Raspberry, Remember Judicial Appointments,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1992, at A27.
363. David Lauter & James Gerstenzang, "Quietly Effective" on Tough Issues After
100 Days, Bush Leaves Few Footprints, LA. TIMES, April 28, 1989, § 1, at 1. "Like
Reagan, Bush has displayed traditional conservative Republican instincts, including a
marked sympathy to big business." Id. See also Nolan Walters, A Genteel Bentsen
Wins Over Critics, DET. FREE PRESS, July 21, 1988, at 16A (describing a conservative
politician as "too allied with big business"); Mike Causey, The Federal Diary - Pay
Raises for 1989, WASH. POST, April 20, 1988, at B2 (calling conservatives "the natural
allies of big business").
364. In its 1992-93 term, the Supreme Court affirmed 40% of the 110 cases to which
it granted review. Coyle, supra note 346, at S1. Furthermore, the Court affirmed 55%
of the 11 state supreme court cases that it reviewed. Id.
One commentator recognized that "deference to the political process was a dom-
inant theme of the 1992-93 term." Robert Giuffra, Whose Center Holds? Political
Branches, Not the Court, Reign Supreme, CONN. L TRIB., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10. See,
e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (refusing to review a state's federal
judge impeachment procedures).
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Scalia and Thomas, reputed as two of the most conservative Justices on
the Court,' were far less in favor of reversing TXO's punitive damag-
es award than any of the other Justices.' Furthermore, Justices
Scalia and Thomas were loyal to Justice Scalia's previous conviction in
Haslip that punitive damages have no substantive due process limita-
tions at all. 7 This illustrates that the most conservative Justices have
no intention of protecting large corporations from punitive damages
awards.'
In addition to the conservative Court's reluctance to reverse lower
court decisions, punitive damages opponents face another potential
barrier when asking the United States Supreme Court to reverse puni-
tive damages awards: punitive damages seem to be an issue where
political opinions do not fall neatly into the traditional categories of
"conservative" and "liberal."'
2. Feeding the Fire of Tort Reform Efforts
The TXO decision disappointed many people who have spent several
decades fighting for tort reform,37° including ex-Vice President Dan
The Court's decision in TXO was an affirmance of the lower court's decision to
uphold the punitive damages award. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2711. However, it was af-
firmed by a mix of both conservative and liberal Justices. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2715;
id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2725 (Scalia, J., concurring). This illus-
trates Professor Ogden's theory that the punitive damages issue does not fall into
traditional political coalitions. See supra note 356 and accompanying text. Would the
Court have affirmed the lower court decision if it had held the punitive damages
award unconstitutional? Based on its affirmance record, it just might have, but this is
mere speculation. Coyle, supra note 346, at S1 (examining the Court's affirmance
record).
365. Justice Scalia has been described as a "long all[y] for conservative activism."
Reuben, supra note 362, at 35. According to Professor Choper, Justice Thomas is
"the most reliable conservative on the [Clourt." Constitutional Law Conference, supra
note 358, at 2263. Professor Choper went on to comment that Justice Thomas "is
periodically alone paired with Justice Scalia in rejecting individual rights claims,
which is not a bad criterion for determining just how conservative he is." Id.
366. Justices Scalia and Thomas concluded that punitive damages awards should be
upheld so long as fair and reasonable procedures were employed in the determination
and review of such awards. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
368. "The [TXO] ruling . . . is a startling example of how a 'conservative' [Clourt
can be bad for big business." Savage, supra note 359, at A14.
369. Interview with Gregory Ogden, supra note 356. See supra notes 356, 364 and
accompanying text.
370. The tort reform movement has been very active over the past 40 years. See
Quayle.37 ' However, tort reformers were encouraged by the Court's
grant of certiorari to the TXO case.372 Many anxiously awaited the an-
nouncement of the Court's decision, expecting the opinion to set forth
some standards, and even specific limitations, for punitive damages.'
However, on June 25, 1993, these hopes were dashed by the Court's
affirmance of the award and its pronouncement that the best it could
give to tort reformers was a soft "reasonableness" standard."7
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), a formal organization
whose main goal is to lobby for tort reform, filed an amicus brief with
the Supreme Court in TXO on behalf of the petitioner, arguing for limi-
tations on punitive damages.75 ATRA argued that although punitive
supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
371. Dan Quayle headed the Bush Administration's push for tort reform, which in-
cluded several reform proposals for punitive damages. See Saundra Torry, Quayle to
Seek Trial Revisions Including Punitive Award Cap, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1991, at
A6; Saundra Torry, Quayle and Bush Administration Take on Civil Justice Reform,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1992, at F5; supra notes 76, 89-95 and accompanying text.
372. Savage, supra note 359, at A14. "Last fall, lawyers for big business were
cheered when the justices announced that they would hear the appeal from TXO ...
[blut [the TXO decision] . . .dashed those hopes." Id. See also Mullenix, supra note
2, at S4.
373. See Newsletter to Track Landmark Punitive Damage Case, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec.
4, 1992 (noting that Scott Jacobs, editor of a litigation report, expected the TXO
decision to clarify Haslip); Shartel, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the TXO Court
should set forth standards for due process review of punitive damages); Nancy E.
Roman, 2 Supreme Court Decisions to Chart Tort-Reform Course, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1993, at A12 (hoping that the TXO Court would set forth such standards). But
see Marcia Coyle, Punitives at Issue, Yet Again: Justices Examine Either "Mirage"
or "Crisis", NAT'L L.J., March 29, 1993, at 1 (noting that Andrew L. Frey, anicus
counsel for tort reform associations in the TXO case, did not expect "a sweeping
pronouncement" from the Court in TXO).
374. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. Many commentators have criticized the reason-
ableness test for being too "soft" and indefinite. For example, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor both observed that the reasonableness "test" was not really a test at all.
TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). See also supra notes 252-53, 292 and accompanying text. Carter Phillips, counsel
for TXO, commented that "the problem with [the reasonableness test] ... is that
'reasonableness' is in the eye of the beholder." Joanne Wojcik, Two Supreme Let-
downs: Failure to Set Punitive Rules May Fuel State Tort Reform Drive, Bus. INS.,
July 5, 1993, at 2. Another commentator noted that "what is 'reasonable' is left to
one's individual imagination." Taking It to The States, supra note 360 at 32.
375. Brief for The American Tort Reform Association, The Association for California
Tort Reform, The Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee, The Minnesota Civil Jus-
tice Coalition, and The Texas Civil Justice League as Amicus Curiae supporting Pe-
titioner, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-
479) [hereinafter ATRA's Brief].
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damages are appropriate in some situations, they have become too
large in both size and frequency.37 The Court was not persuaded by
ATRA's arguments.3"
In addition to ATRA, there are many other interest groups whose
members feel strongly about the TXO decision. For example, business
groups, the American Medical Association, and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry vehemently oppose the Court's decision to uphold large punitive
damages awards. These groups contend that such awards are unfair and
adversely affect the international competitiveness of American business-
es. 8 On the other hand, consumer groups and plaintiffs' attorneys ar-
gue that large punitive damages awards are necessary in some situa-
tions to "keep dangerous products off the market and to protect the
public against corporate greed.""
Due to the Court's "passive" response to their repeated appeals for
punitive damages limitations,' tort reformers are likely to start lobby-
ing the other two branches of the federal government, as well as state
376. ATRA's Brief at 4, TXO (No. 92-479) (noting that "as the size of punitive dam-
ages awards has grown exponentially in recent years, more and more of them-like
the judgment in this case-have borne no discernible relationship to the gravity of
the defendant's misconduct"). See also Product Liability Advisory Council's Brief at
23, 7XO (No. 92-479) (recognizing that "the frequency and size of punitive damages
has skyrocketed").
377. See TXO, 113 S. CL at 2718-24 (affirming the punitive damages award, despite
claims by many, including the petitioner and ATRA, that the award in this case was
excessive).
378. High Court Upholds Large Punitive-Damage Award: The $10 Million Was 526
Times the $19,000 in Damages. The Court Said That Was Not "Grossly Excessive",
PHI"A INQUIRER, June 26, 1993, at Dl. See also Savage, supra note 359, at A14. TXO
has been termed "a major setback for corporate America." Id. The insurance industry,
a major component of corporate America is equally concerned about the Court's
decision. Gastel, supra note 6. The National Association of Manufacturers was also
disappointed by the TXO decision. High Court Refuses to Cap Punitive Damage
Awards, supra note 2, at B1.
379. High Court Upholds Large Punitive-Damage Award, supra note 378, at DI. In
response to TXO, Linda Lipsen, legislative director of Consumers Union said, "Today's
decision sends a message to corporations . . . that they can't harm victims of dan-
gerous products and shoddy services with impunity." Savage, supra note 359, at 14.
See also infra note 402 and accompanying text.
380. For examples of unsuccessful attempts by tort reformers to argue for a nation-
al punitive damages limitation policy from the Supreme Court, see generally TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 27il (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); ATRA's Brief, TXO (No. 92-479); Product Liability
Advisory Council's Brief, TXO (No. 92479).
legislatures."' Large corporations, along with ATRA, are likely to head
up the fight for legislative punitive damages limits.' Not too far be-
hind will follow the defense lawyers and manufacturing profession-
als.8
3. The Clinton Administration's Response
In the late 1980s, the Bush Administration became involved in a civil
justice reform campaign, which was headed by former Vice President
Dan Quayle.' This reform campaign included proposed limitations on
punitive damages.' Some commentators believed that the Bush Ad-
ministration only proposed punitive damages reforms because, as con-
servative Republicans, they wanted to appease large corporations by
shielding them from liability for multi-million dollar judgments.'
Unfortunately for those Bush Administration critics, but perhaps
fortunately for large corporations that are vulnerable to large punitive
damage awards, the Clinton Administration appears to be following
former President Bush's lead in punitive damages reform.387 For exam-
ple, the Health Care Reform proposal includes a provision that would
possibly tie the amount of punitive damages to actual damages.'m
381. "Upholding a punitive damages award 526 times the size of the compensatory
award . . . handed the reformers a piece of propaganda." Rice, supra note 20, at 14.
382. Gastel, supra note 6 (discussing in depth the insurance industry's response to
TXO).
383.. These two groups were well represented among the amicus curia who submit-
ted briefs to the Supreme Court in support of TXO. See generally Product Liability
Advisory Council's Brief, TXO (No. 92-479); Brief for the Washington Legal Founda-
tion as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, TXO (No. 92479) [hereinafter Washing-
ton Legal Foundation's Brief]; Brief for the American Automobile Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, American Insurance Association, American Petroleum Institute, Business
Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Chemical Manufacturers
Association, and National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae supporting
Petitioner, TXO (No. 92479) [hereinafter American Automobile Manufacturer's Brief].
See also Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4 ("The products liability bar followed with great
trepidation this controversial appeal concerning the limits on punitive damages, and
defense lawyers now know that apparently there aren't many limits.").
384. See supra notes 76, 89-95 (discussing Quayle's involvement in the tort reform
movement).
385. See supra notes 89-97 (discussing proposals for punitive damages reform).
386. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1277 (arguing that former Vice Presi-
dent Quayle "wishes to undermine punitive damages precisely because such damages
constrain big business" and that "he attacks only those provisions of the civil justice
system that impede the activities of economic elites").
387. David G. Savage, Health Care Plan Skirts Malpractice Issues, LA. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1993, at A17.
388. Id. (noting that Congress has enacted similar punitive damages limitations in
federal antitrust laws by capping punitive damages at three times the actual damag-
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4. New Legislation on Punitive Damages
In 1991, in light of the Haslip decision, many commentators believed
that states would be quick to respond to the Court's "hint" that legisla-
tures were the proper forum for improvement of the punitive damages
system.8 9 At that time, many states already had legislation limiting pu-
nitive damages, and much of this legislation is still in place today." In
fact, most of the state statutory law regarding punitive damages limita-
tions was enacted prior to the Haslip decision, not in response to it."9
Now, in the wake of the TXO decision, there are predictions of new
legislation in this area.' Because the TXO punitive damages award
was a great deal larger and much more disproportionate with its corre-
sponding compensatory damages award than the award upheld in
Haslip,m and because the 7XO Court provided even less guidance to
es). See alsQ Rorie Sherman, Health Plan to Have Major Legal Impact, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 20, 1993, at 1 (recognizing that caps on punitive damages are likely to be in-
cluded in Clinton's health care plan).
389. King, supra note 115, at 350.
390. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 732, 733 (Deering 1983) (limiting punitive
damages awards in certain waste and trespass actions to treble damages); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-64-302 (Supp. 1990) (limiting medical malpractice non-economic damages to
$250,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-5(c) (West 1987) (disallowing punitive damages in
products liability actions involving food or drugs licensed by the FDA). For a more
complete list, see Petitioners Brief at 18-20, TXO (No. 92-479).
391. Although some legislation limiting punitive damages was enacted in 1992, such
as Colorado's statute capping punitive damages in medical malpractice cases, most
punitive damages legislation that is currently in existence was enacted in the 1970s
and 1980s, well before the Court's announcement of the Haslip decision in 1991. See,
e.g., supra notes 95, 390 and accompanying text (discussing various types of legisla-
tive caps on punitive damages).
392. Gastel, supra note 6 ("[E]xperts say that the . . . [TXO] ruling will make legis-
lation at the federal or state level more likely.").
393. The punitive damages award upheld in Haslip was $840,000, four times the
compensatory damages award of $200,000. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4. The punitive damag-
es award upheld in TXO was $10 million, 526 times the compensatory damages
award of $19,000. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2717. The TXO punitive damages award was
both significantly higher and more disproportionate to its corresponding compensatory
award than the Haslip punitive damages award. Moreover, the compensatory damages
awarded in TXO were significantly lower than the Haslip compensatory damages, the
TXO award being one tenth of the Haslip award. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4; TXO, 113
S. Ct. at 2717.
lower courts than the Haslip Court did," tort reformers are probably
more likely to channel their disappointment into social action.
Despite the fact that many jurisdictions have already limited punitive
damages to some extent, tort reformers apparently are not yet satis-
fied." It is quite likely that state legislatures will soon find themselves
inundated with letters, phone calls, and visits from lobbyists who think
that the current legislation simply does not go far enough.' There will
no doubt be a stronger push for limitations such as absolute caps on
punitive damages, proportionality requirements between actual and
punitive damages, and the abolition of punitive damages completely in
some situations. 7 Whether state legislatures will respond to the pres-
sure remains to be seen.
C. Social Impact
The potential social impact of the TXO decision is substantial. For
example, in response to the wealth of commentary that TXO is "a victo-
ry for plaintiffs," ' many people who feel that they have been wronged
by large entities with large resources may be encouraged to pursue
large punitive damages awards in court.' After all, in this already
394. The Haslip Court at least inferred that a punitive damages award that was
four times larger than the compensatory damages award was "close to the line."
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. The TXO plurality, other than in references to the Haslip
decision, did not repeat this statement, or present any similar inferences. See TXO,
113 S. Ct. at 2718-24. In fact, the TXO plurality conveniently avoided presenting any
numerical guidelines whatsoever.
395. Despite this long list of statutes limiting punitive damages, the tort reform
movement is still alive and very healthy. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying
text. See also ATRA's Brief at 29, TXO (No. 92-479) (arguing that "state legislation
has not proved to be a uniformly effective answer to the problem of excessive pun-
ishments"); GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 30, at Appendix 21A (listing state statutes
limiting punitive damages, most of which were enacted prior to 1991).
396. See Rice, supra note 20, at 14. "The National Law Journal predicts that the
[Clourt's decision in TXO will increase pressure from business for legislative caps on
punitive damages." Id.
397. Interview with Gregory Ogden, supra note 356. See also Wojcik, supra note
374, at 2 ("[Blusiness groups . . . say that TXO affirms their decision to lobby state
legislatures individually to set limits on punitive damage awards.").
398. Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4 (recognizing that "the [TXO] decision was...
great for plaintiffs"); High Court Refuses to Cap Punitive Damage Awards, supra
note 2, at BI (noting that the TXO ruling is "hailed as a victory for consumers").
399. See Gene Fadness, Time to Cap Big Awards in the Lawsuit Lottery, IDAHO
FALLs POST REG., April 9, 1993, at A8 (terming the current punitive damages system
"the lawsuit lottery"); Ruth Marcus, Are Punitive Damage Awards Fair to Firms?:
Supreme Court Finally Agrees to Referee High-Stakes Dispute, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
1990, at H1 (analogizing civil litigation to state lotteries); Adler, supra note 80, at 1
(arguing that "the current punitive damages system ... effectively turns the
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very litigious society, where punitive damages awards have become
increasingly popular, people are likely to feel quite confident about
their chances of obtaining large punitive awards.41 If this increase in
lawsuits does occur, it will put quite a burden on the judicial system's
resources. Furthermore, if large punitive damages awards continue to
be assessed frequently against large corporations, some of these compa-
nies may be driven out of business, further impinging upon America's
already sunken economy.' Finally, large manufacturers may be dis-
couraged from producing new products for fear of being slapped with
large punitive damages awards.4°
On the other hand, the TXO decision is also likely to make large
corporations think harder before they act, thus protecting their custom-
ers by providing them with better products and services.4" This might
courtroom into a gambling casino").
400. Daniel B. Moskowitz, Punitive Damages: Setting Standards for Legal Wild
Card, WASH: POST, Oct. 1, 1990, at F26. "Western civilization has gotten along for
centuries without detailed standards on punitive damages, primarily because they
were so rarely awarded. But lawyers for plaintiffs have been getting increasingly
adept at winning such bonanzas for their clients." Id. If this quote truly reflects pub-
lic perception of punitive damages, it explains the confidence of many plaintiffs suing
for punitive damages.
401. Marcus, supra note 399, at HI (noting the asbestos industry's complaints that
punitive damages "helped drive companies into bankruptcy"). Furthermore, business
organizations argue that large punitive damages awards like the one in TXO are "typi-
cal of those that . . . destroy international competitiveness." High Court Refuses to
Cap Punitive Damage Awards, supra note 2, at BI.
402. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L
REV. 975, 988 (1989). "Uncertainty as to potential liability induces overinvestment in
liability avoidance, or worse, suppresses innovation." Id. (citing Gurule v. Illinois Mut.
Life and Casualty Co., 734 P.2d 85, 86-87 (1987)). See also Fadness, supra note 399,
at A8 (arguing that "the threat of such huge financial losses stifles competition and
innovation," citing pharmaceutical companies' reluctance to test AIDS vaccines as an
example); Marcus, supra note 399, at HI (arguing that the potential for large punitive
damages awards discourages manufacturers' innovative activity); Moskowitz, supra
note 400, at F26 (providing an example of an asbestos substitute manufacturer that
decided against marketing a product because of the risk of large punitive damages
awards); GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 30, §§ 6.08-6.09 (discussing the public policy
problems associated with allowing large punitive damages awards in products liability
cases).
403. Consumer groups argue that "one solution to punitive damages is for compa-
nies to market only safe products and to treat customers, employees and the public
with care." Moskowitz, supra note 400, at F26. The argument is that if companies are
more careful, their chances of having to pay large punitive damages awards will de-
crease substantially. Id. Thus, it follows that if punitive damages are not limited,
be good for the economy because people might be more willing to
spend money if they can count on receiving the quality they believe
they deserve.' Moreover, the availability of large punitive damages
awards might mitigate the oppression of ordinary people by large cor-
porations, thereby furthering one of the oldest and most fundamental
policies behind punitive damages: protection of the disadvantaged."
Finally, many commentators argue that the continued potential for
large punitive damages awards will discourage plaintiffs from settling
their cases because of the likelihood that courts will uphold large puni-
tive damages awards assessed by juries.' This could end up costing
the judicial system unnecessary time and money. 7 It may also ob-
struct the growing alternative dispute resolution movement,' thereby
companies will be more careful to protect consumers.
Furthermore, many people argue that punitive damages limitations would actually
eliminate the incentive to avoid the production of dangerous products in some cases.
For example, before the Haslip decision was announced, consumer groups argued
that capping punitive damages awards would allow defendant corporations to reduce
the risk of being slapped with large punitive damages awards to mathematical calcu-
lations, thus allowing these corporations to "shield themselves" from liability. Adler,
supra note 80, at 20. See also Marcus, supra note 399, at HI (arguing that if punitive
damages were limited, companies "would simply factor them into their calculations as
a cost of doing business"); D. Frederick Hoopes, Punitive Award Must be High to
Deter Corporations, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Apr. 28, 1993, at A8 (arguing that puni-
tive damages caps would permit "callous corporate calculations"); GHIARDI & KIRCHER,
supra note 30, § 6.12 (discussing how companies calculate punitive damages as a
cost of doing business).
404. See supra note 403 and accompanying text. If more consumers purchase goods
and services, companies will have more money to invest, yielding a positive net re-
sult for the economy. Of course, punitive damages is only one of many factors that
contribute to the ebb and flow of the economy.
405. For example, Bruce Ennis, Mrs. Haslip's lawyer in the Haslip case, argued that
.when you make it easy for people to calculate the consequences of conduct, then
you don't deter it." Marcus, supra note 399, at HI. See also supra notes 39-48 (de-
scribing the original purposes of punitive damages); supra notes 66-71 (describing the
modern rationales of punitive damages).
406. For example, Don Bowen, President of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association,
argues that "the anti-lawsuit movement in Texas has resulted in fewer cases being
settled and more going to court," and he does not view this as success. Nancy E.
Roman, Lobby Effort to Curb Litigation Turns to States for Tort Reform, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at A4. Furthermore, plaintiffs might be similarly discouraged from
submitting their cases to arbitration because "arbitrators rarely grant huge dollar judg-
ments and are loathe to hand out punitive damages for willful corporate wrongdoing."
Jane B. Quinn, More Companies Hide Behind the Shield of Arbitration, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 1992, at H3.
407. According to Andrew L. Frey, author of the ATRA's amicus brief, "there are
lots of cases out there that would have been settled long ago, but for the chance of
hitting the jackpot." Biskupic, supra note 275, at CI.
408. See Diane Seo, Talk is Cheap, and also Valuable: Dispute Resolution Process
Gains Popularity by Avoiding High Cost of Long Legal Battles, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22,
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slowing down the evolution of what may potentially be a more efficient
justice system in which the parties, and not a judge or jury, hold the
fate of their cases in their own hands."
VI. CONCLUSION
Up against an animal sacrifice case,4"' an abortion access case, 1
and a pornography case,4" the TXO v. Alliance decision has been de-
scribed as "this year's most sensational U.S. Supreme Court case. "4"3
Perhaps this description stems from the potential massive impact of
TXO on so many aspects of this nation.4"4 TXO evinces the conserva-
tive Court's deference to the political process 1 5 and constitutes a
1993, at Jl (noting that a growing number of individuals and businesses are choosing
alternative dispute resolution processes to resolve their disputes); The Go Betweens:
Fed Up With a Costly Judicial System, an Increasing Number of Individuals and
Businesses Are Trying to Resolve Their Disputes With the Help of Trained Media-
tors, Conciliators and Arbitrators, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1993, City Times section, at 14
(recognizing the increasing popularity of alternative dispute resolution); Thomas W.
Lippman, Utilities Find Alternative to a Costly Court Battle: Private Resolution
Keeps Cases from Public, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1992, at C1 (describing the alternative
dispute resolution movement as "a fast-growing phenomenon").
409. Benny L. Kass, Choosing to Arbitrate Instead of Litigate, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
1993, at ElO (recognizing that litigation is expensive, in terms of time and money,
and that arbitration is often much less expensive and more efficient); Lippman, supra
note 408, at Cl (noting that "more and more companies are circumventing the clut-
tered calendars, expensive procedures and public scrutiny of conventional court trials
in favor of informal tribunals").
410. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2234 (1993)
(holding that a state's ban on animal sacrifice is unconstitutional under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
411. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 768 (1993) (holding
that a federal civil rights law cannot be used to prevent anti-abortion activists from
blockading health clinics).
412. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993) (holding that the gov-
ernment can seize and destroy adult magazines and videos that were part of a por-
nography empire, but not the basis of criminal charges, without offending the First
Amendment).
413. Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4.
414. See generally supra notes 326-409 and accompanying text (discussing the judi-
cial, legislative, political, and social impacts of TXO). See also Mullenix, supra note 2,
at S4 (discussing generally some of the likely impacts of TX0).
415. Giuffra, supra note 364, at 10. "Changes in the political landscape have low-
ered the Court's profile. For the first time in more than a generation, the same party
controls the presidency and . . . Congress, while the Court is dominated by justices
sweeping victory for plaintiffs.41 Whether defendants will fight back
remains to be seen.
TXO officially marks the end of the short-lived Haslip era, during
which a four-to-one ratio of punitive damages to actual damages was
"close to the line.""7 State courts must now rethink their strategies,
while state legislatures are likely to begin buzzing with activity toward
the enactment of local standards for punitive damages."8 Meanwhile,
in Washington, D.C., President Clinton and Congress are diligently
working to incorporate punitive damages standards into the health care
plan '1
9
In short, TXO was not the test-producing case that many had envi-
sioned.42 In fact, TXO threw certainty and predictability out the win-
dow regarding due process limitations on punitive damages.421 Howev-
er, in light of TXO, one thing is certain: if bright line punitive damages
limitations are to be set, the United States Supreme Court is not going
to be the one to do it.4u
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committed to deference to the political branches." Id. See also Rice, supra note 20,
at 14; Coyle, supra note 346, at Si (discussing the conservative Court).
416. Mullenix, supra note 2, at S4 (arguing that the TXO decision favors plaintiffs
who seek large punitive damages awards against powerful defendants).
417. Wojcik, supra note 374, at 2. According to Laurence Tribe, TXO left the
Haslip four-to-one ratio argument "dead as a doornail." Id. See also supra notes 14-
18 and accompanying text (discussing 7XO's effect on the four-to-one ratio limitation
implied in Haslip).
418. Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tanger, Punitive Damages, the Constitution, and
Due Process, THE RECORDER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 8. "TXO sends the clear message that
legislation and state common law, not federal constitutional law, must play the pri-
mary role in ensuring a sensible system for imposition of punitive damages and in
preventing excessive punishments." Id. "There is a real need for new guidelines but
state legislatures are going to have to fashion them." Savage, supra note 359, at A14.
See also Steven Brostoff, Top Court Sets No Standard to Limit Punitive Damages,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 5, 1993, at I (recognizing that because the TXO Court re-
fused to set forth punitive damages standards, state legislatures will now have to
address the issue); supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text (discussing the punitive damag-
es cap in President Clinton's health care plan).
420. Supreme Court Proceedings, supra note 5. See also supra note 373 and accom-
panying text (discussing commentators expectations for the TXO decision).
421. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. See also Biskupic, supra note 275,
at CI ("[Blecause . .. .TXO] did not produce a majority in favor of any particular
reasoning, the decision is likely to add to the controversy rather than resolve it.").
422. According to Victor Schwartz, author of the amicus brief of the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers and several other business organizations, "The [Clourt is not
going to write new rules of law in this area .... There is a real need for new
guidelines but state legislatures are going to have to fashion them." Savage, supra
note 359, at A14.
